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ABSTRACT

Selling Civil Defense: The Politics and
Commerce of Preparedness,
1950-1963
by
Angela Christine Moor
Dr. Elizabeth Fraterrigo, Examination Committee Chair
Assistant Professor o f History
University of Nevada, Las Vegas
This thesis, by examining how business, government, and civic leaders promoted
civil defense, shows how a policy o f self-help merged the roles o f citizen and consumer
and how family-centered preparedness equated the survival o f the nuclear family with the
victory of the US in the Cold War. Civil defense officials helped reinforce messages
about gender roles by stressing the value o f nuclear families and the crucial role each
family member played in the defense o f America. Public information campaigns
emphasized the importance o f free enterprise and privatization by endorsing a policy of
self-help for American families whereby individual families were responsible for the
purchase o f their own means of survival. This thesis will help us better understand the
early years of the Cold War by showing how consumption became entwined with civic
duty through the efforts o f civil defense officials. These efforts created an image o f civil
defense that centered on a model citizen in the marketplace purchasing the products
needed to guarantee his and his family’s own survival.
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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION
A leaflet distributed to owners o f Dairy Dan Ice Cream trucks from the early
1950s asserted that the owners’ trucks were “now an official unit o f the United States
Civil Defense Network,” it went on to list a variety of ways the trucks could provide
crucial services following an atomic attack. The trucks could provide refrigeration,
illumination, and a clean water supply. It praised the owners saying, “You and your
Dairy Dan unit are of inestimable value to your community.”' The assertion that an ice
cream truck could prove invaluable in case of an atomic attack proves useful in
understanding the ways in which civil defense entered the American consciousness in the
early years of the Cold War. By assuming that ice cream trucks would still be circling
suburban neighborhoods following an atomic bomb blast, the leaflet downplayed the real
threat of atomic war. It also demonstrates the crucial institutionalization o f civil defense
in the marketplace as everyday goods and services became identified as part o f the
survival effort. Americans faced a multitude o f messages about preparedness during the
early years o f the Cold War, all o f which largely held to the official position that survival
of an atomic bomb was possible. Civil defense provides an important lens on the ways
that the Cold War entered everyday domestic life and how the concept o f consensus

’ Dairy Dan Leaflet, Virgil L. Couch Papers, 1951-1958 (Couch Papers); Box 20, Civil Defense
Publications by Businesses and Corporations, 1950-1958 (5), Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Library
(DDEL).

helped shape postwar American culture and politics. The idea o f consensus linked
consumption with democracy, helped define appropriate roles for men and women, and
pitted American affluence as a counter to Soviet communism. This thesis, by examining
how business, government, and civic leaders promoted civil defense, shows how a policy
o f self-help merged the roles o f citizen and consumer and how family-centered
preparedness equated the survival o f the family with the victory o f the US in the Cold
War. It is not concerned with the number o f shelters constructed or volunteers committed
to recovery, but instead with the ways in which the promotion o f civil defense helped to
inform the consensus of the postwar period and why Americans largely rejected such
preparedness measures. Examining the selling o f civil defense offers a way o f seeing the
dialogue that existed between the Cold War and domestic consumption during this
period.

Figure 1- Leaflet distributed to Dairy Dan Ice Cream Truck Owners

In 1950, President Harry S. Truman established the Federal Civil Defense
Administration (FCDA) with the goal o f limiting casualties in the event of an atomic war
with the Soviet Union. The concept o f civil defense, resting on a premise that it was
possible to survive an atomic, and later hydrogen, bomb blast was a tough sell for the
American public, but nevertheless American policymakers, business leaders, and civic
groups united to promote the cause. The idea of civil defense stretched well beyond the
sphere of preparedness and offered information about home, family, and morality. The
selling o f civil defense, because o f its connection to both mass consumption and the Cold
War, allows us to identify the real relationship that existed between the Cold War and
domestic politics and culture.
Recognizing that a massive program o f state-sponsored shelter building was
contrary to the American view on the role o f government, the FCDA focused its attention
on a massive public education campaign. This effort not only aimed to instruct
Americans about the need for civil defense, but the campaign also promoted the free
enterprise system with its dependence on corporate sponsorship. Faced with chronic
budget shortages, the FCDA established a series of partnerships with private enterprise
under the guise o f “cooperative promotion” to educate Americans about civil defense.^
Promoters of civil defense elevated their message from a policy o f preparation against
possible nuclear attack to a hallmark o f patriotic, good citizenship for Americans. Home
preparedness, one o f the most important civil defense policies o f the early 1950s,
emphasized efficiency and preparation for the suburban home as crucial in sustaining the
nation during and after an attack. This policy used the moral foundations o f American

^ This phrase appears throughout official FCDA literature to refer to collaborations with various
mass media outlets to spread the message o f civil defense.

homes and families and recast homemaking from a domestic duty into a civic obligation.
Civil defense officials helped reinforce messages about gender roles by stressing the
value o f nuclear families and the crucial role each family member played in the defense
of America. Other campaigns emphasized the importance o f free enterprise and
privatization by endorsing policies o f self-help for American families and lauding the
participation o f private companies in the nation’s civil defense efforts. Together these
efforts created an image o f civil defense that centered on a model citizen in the
marketplace purchasing the products needed to guarantee his and his family’s own
survival.
The FCDA worked with many groups to spread its message o f survival. The non
profit Advertising Council created and distributed a number o f public service campaigns
on the need for preparedness. Atomic bomb tests at the Nevada Test Site provided the
FCDA with important opportunities to assess the effectiveness o f civil defense policy and
to drum up interest in the civil defense program. Civic organizations and private
companies also took part in the distribution o f survival information. Each o f these key
groups played an important role in the promotion of civil defense during the early Cold
War.
Cold War civil defense, though it took on a decidedly different form, had its
origin in World War II. President Franklin Roosevelt took the first official steps for
preparedness during World War II when he created the Office o f Civilian Defense in
1941 to “coordinate measures o f federal, state, and local government for protection o f the

civilian population in war emergencies.”^ In 1945, President Truman disbanded the
office by executive order."* The testing o f an atomic bomb by the USSR in 1949,
however, regenerated interest in civil defense and, bowing to public pressure. President
Truman asked the National Security Resources Board (NSRB) to take over survival
planning.^ In 1950, at the advice o f the NSRB he established the Federal Civil Defense
Administration in the office o f emergency management with an executive order.^ Shortly
after. Congress passed legislation to make it an independent agency dedicated to civil
defense.^
A three-part objective, captured in the motto “Survive, Recover, and Win,”
energized the new unit.^ Four functions guided early civil defense planning: “(1)
measures designed to prevent an enemy attack; (2) measures designed to reduce the
effects o f an enemy attack; (3) services which will alleviate the damage o f an enemy
attack; (4) and general measures pertaining to the overall program.”^ The new
administration faced a number of challenges during its early days. The appointment of
Millard Caldwell as the first director o f the FCDA angered the NAACP and other

^ “History o f Civil Defense,” President’s Secretary’s File (PSF); Box 193, Civil Defense, Harry S.
Truman Library (HSTL). Activities during World War II included things like victory gardens, salvage
drives, and air-raid drills.
“History o f Civil Defense,” PSF; Box 193, Civil Defense, HSTL.
^ Ibid.
®Ibid.
^ Corey Brewer, Civil Defense in the United States: Federal State and Local. (Library of
Congress Legislative Reference Service, Washington: I95I), iv.
* Spencer R. Weart, “History o f American Attitudes Toward Civil Defense,” in Civil Defense: A
Choice o f Disasters, edited by John Dowling and Evans M. Harrell. (New York: American Institute o f
Physics, 1987), 13.
^ Brewer, 4.

progressive groups because o f racist statements he made as Florida governor."* Letters to
the White House about Caldwell’s appointment questioned his commitment to protect all
Americans.” The FCDA also faced constant cuts in its budget from Congress. In 1951,
Congress funded civil defense efforts at $65 million, rather than the $535 million
requested by the FCDA citing claims that real protection o f civilians would be far too
costly and the best hope was “to altogether avoid war.” *^ President Truman called
Congress’ allocation “tragically insufficient.”'^ Such statements became routine at the
FCDA. In 1952, the president called the ninety percent reduction in allocation a repeat of
a “gross error.” '"* Millard Caldwell likened the 1953 appropriations to Russian roulette.'^
Failure to obtain adequate funding from Congress prompted the FCDA to enter into a
number o f partnerships with industry and other groups to spread its message of
preparedness.
Civil defense material between 1950 and 1963 largely appealed to Americans’
sense o f patriotic duty by framing preparedness as a measure o f good citizenship and
offered little technical information about survival. The messages offered by the FCDA
through the Ad Council, civic groups, and business others all made important
associations between civil defense and good citizenship as they equated characteristics
Andrew Grossman, “Segregationist Liberalism; The NAACP and Resistance to Civil-Defense
Planning in the Early Cold War, 1951 - 1 9 5 3 International Journal o f Politics, Culture, and Society. 13:3
( 2000 ).
" Numerous examples can be found in the White House Central Files (WHCF): OF (Official File)
2965, HSTL. The majority o f letters were form letters used by members o f NAACP branches across the
United States.
“Bomb Shelters Away,” Time, September 3, 1951.
Statement by the President, November 2, 1951; PSF; Box 193, Historical File, 1945-1953,
HSTL.
Statement by the President, July 15, 1952; PSF; Box 193, Historical File, 1945-1953, HSTL.
Federal Civil Defense Administration, “Press Information no. 257,” Spencer R. Quick Files
(Quick Files); Box 6, Civil Defense Campaign - General (1), HSTL.

such as civic-mindedness, homeownership, and family togetherness with survival. These
messages can help us better understand the ways that civil defense helped domesticate the
doomsday destruction of the Cold War.
Throughout the 1950s, because o f an inability to secure funding sufficient to
establish a more active civil defense program, the FCDA focused on the relatively
inexpensive process of distributing information to Americans about the possibility o f
survival through home preparedness. In 1953 and 1955, the FCDA participated in test
operations at the Nevada Test Site. Following the tests, the FCDA released books and
movies for the public urging them to undertake civil defense measures in their homes. In
1954 and 1955, a new understanding o f the harmful nature of fallout and changing
technology including long-range missiles and exponentially more powerful bombs altered
civil defense policy. Instead o f assuming that the primary threat to the population would
come from heat and blast wave, it became evident that the increased destructive power of
the H-bomb would necessitate evacuation from targeted areas. By the mid-1950s, civil
defense virtually disappeared from national conversation as the Cold W ar stabilized and
the American public focused their attention on the expanding economy.
Civil defense re-entered national debate in the early 1960s as Americans, faced
with the Bay o f Pigs invasion and the Cuban Missile Crisis, recognized the renewed
possibility of nuclear war. Home fallout shelters were marketed as the best bet for
survival and dealers sprang up around the country to sell backyard shelters to suburban
families. Articles in mass media publications addressed the moral cost o f fallout shelters
and questioned what type o f world would greet survivors on their emergence. The fervor

surrounding the fallout shelter was short-lived, however, and by 1963 the market for
fallout shelters collapsed.
Limited scholarly attention has been paid to the development o f American civil
defense.

A number o f books on the Cold War examine it only in passing as part of

domestic Cold War programs and the influence o f the atomic bomb on 1950s American
culture.'^ Other authors examine the ways civil defense interacted with changing notions
o f gender and family in postwar America through a system o f “domestic containment.”'®
Other works focus on the institutional development and policies o f the FCDA and its
successors.'^ These books, along with a handful o f articles, represent the extent of

'** Scholars who focus on postwar America largely ignore civil defense, but their works provide
important context for understanding postwar American culture. One o f the most useful books on postwar
America is Lizabeth Cohen’s A Consumer’s Republic: the Politics o f Mass Consumption In Postwar
America. Her analysis o f postwar America and the connections between citizenship and consumption
offers a useful framework for relating civil defense to American politics. She argues that mass
consumption effectively set the dimensions o f postwar society.
These include: Paul Boyer, By the Bom b’s Early Light: American Thought and Culture at the
Dawn o f the Atomic Age (New York: Pantheon, 1985); Stephen J. Whitfield, The Culture o f the Cold War
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991); and Allan M. Winkler, Life Under a Cloud: American
Anxiety about the Atom (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993).
The idea o f domestic containment emerged from Elaine Tyler May’s Homeward Bound:
American Families in the Cold War Era (New York: Basic Books, 1988), but a number o f subsequent
authors have used her construction in examining the effects o f the Cold War on American culture. Both
Laura McEnaney, Civil Defense Begins at Home: Militarization Meets Everyday Life in the Fifties
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000); and Dee Garrison, Bracing fo r Armageddon: Why Civil
Defense Never Worked (Oxford: New York: Oxford University Press, 2006) have examined the
relationship between gender and civil defense campaigns. Garrison’s work offers an important counter
narrative to the existing scholarship. She advances a theory that civil defense played an important role in
the strategy o f deterrence between the United States and the Soviet Union and skillfully relates domestic
civil defense policies to international politics.
Andrew D. Grossman, Neither D ead nor R ed Civilian Defense and American Political
Development During the Early Cold War (New York: Routledge, 2001). Grossman provides important
insight into the influence o f the FCDA, but his work is hindered by his denunciation o f other works on civil
defense that focus on material culture. Kenneth D. Rose, One Nation Underground: A History o f the
Fallout Shelter (New York: New York University Press, 2004) places the fallout shelter at the center o f his
analysis as he traces the development o f the American civil defense program. Guy Oakes, The Imaginary
War: American Civil Defense and American Cold War Culture (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994)
focuses on the disconnect between the official message o f the FCDA, which held that survival was
possible, and the awareness o f government officials that nearly all efforts at survival would prove futile in
case o f an attack.

scholarly literature on civil defense/^ They offer a valuable summary o f the
development and eventual demise o f the national civil defense program. Some o f them
offer limited insight into the ways different groups, especially women, participated in
organized civil defense efforts. Understanding the institutional development o f the
American civil defense program provides needed background, but the real importance of
civil defense in the early years o f the Cold W ar lies in the ways in intersected with
broader American culture.
The evolution o f civil defense between 1950 and 1963 is the focus o f this thesis
because this period encompasses the rise and fall of home-based preparedness. The
second chapter, “Survive, Recover, Win: Public Education Campaigns o f the FCDA”
uses documents, reports, and correspondence from the FCDA to trace the various
methods the FCDA used to indoctrinate the public on the policy o f civil defense.
Although ostensibly about survival, the campaigns spread overt messages about what it
meant to be a good American. Chapter three, “A Tough Sell: The Advertising Council
and Civil Defense” examines the tensions between the FCDA and the Ad Council
through correspondence between the Advertising Council, the FCDA, and the White
House. This chapter also identifies the imagery and themes through which the
advertisements connected preparedness and good citizenship. The design, promotion,
and success o f the largely forgotten Alert America exhibit are examined in the fourth
chapter, “The Show Y ou’ll Never Forget: The Alert America Convoy.” Drawing on
archival materials from the Kenneth D. Wells collection at Brigham Young University,
JoAnne Brown, “A Is for Atom, B Is for Bomb: Civil Defense in American Education, 19481963,” Journal o f American History 75, no. 1 (1988): 68-90; Sarah A. Lichtman, “Do-It-Yourself Security:
Safety, Gender, and the Home Fallout Shelter in Cold War America.” Journal o f Design History 19, no. 1
(2006): 39-55; Guy Oakes and Andrew Grossman. “Managing Nuclear Terror: The Genesis o f American
Civil Defense Strategy,” International Journal o f Politics, Culture, and Society 5, no. 3 (1992), 361-403.

the chapter traces the exhibit from its planning stages through its tour. Chapter four,
“Dummy Doomtown in the Desert: Civil Defense and the Nevada Test Site,” details the
relationship of the FCDA to the atomic bomb tests and the way the tests were used to
further downplay the dangers o f aboveground atomic weapons tests. Newspaper and
magazine articles, official reports, television programs, and correspondence all provide
important insight into the ways officials framed the tests for public consumption.
Advertisements are the main source for the sixth chapter, “Purchasing Survival:
Preparedness Products” and show how the roles o f citizen and consumer overlapped in
the postwar period. The final chapter, “Civil Defense Goes Underground: The Fallout
Shelter,” focuses on the boom and bust o f the fallout shelter market through
advertisements and articles from newspapers and magazines.
This thesis will help us better understand the early years o f the Cold War by
showing how consumption became entwined with civic duty through the efforts o f civil
defense officials. The promotion o f self-help as the main policy o f preparedness
effectively conflated the roles o f citizen and consumer. This exemplifies the important
evolution in the definition of American citizenship that occurred in this period, as a new
emphasis on consumption as a patriotic duty came to define what it meant to be a good
American. By analyzing the ways civil defense was promoted by the government,
business, and civic groups during the 1950s, this thesis exposes the relationship between
Cold War politics and domestic culture, public and private lives, and demonstrates how
the language of civil defense was used to mold public opinion on atomic weapons and in
turn endorse the ongoing militarization o f American culture.
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CHAPTER 2

SURVIVE, RECOVER, WIN: PUBLIC EDUCATION CAMPAIGNS OF THE
FEDERAL CIVIL DEFENSE ADMINISTRATION
In 1950, the National Security Resources Board released the Cold W ar’s first
book on civil defense. The United States Civil Defense Program?^ The book called for
the creation o f an independent federal agency for civil defense, argued that panic was the
greatest problem facing civil defense planners, and placed the family at the center of
preparedness.^^ In a departure from World War Il-era civil defense planning that focused
on community efforts, an insistence on the family as the core of civil defense efforts
guided survival planning throughout the 1950s and early 1960s. The book presented
readers with a graphic representation of family-centered civil defense planning, labeled
the National Civil Defense Pattern. The image, made up o f concentric rings, went from
the federal government, to the state, nearby cities, community, neighborhood, and ended
with the family and individual in the middle.^^ According to the chart, the family was the
“base o f organized self-protection” and the individual was “calm and well-trained.” The
characterization of civil defense as primarily an individual effort partly reflected
Executive Office o f the President, National Security Resources Board, United States Civil
Defense (Washington: GPO, 1950). The book is also known as the “Blue Book” because o f the color o f its
cover. The NSRB took civil defense on as a responsibility in March o f 1949. Harry B. Yoshpe, Our
Missing Shield: The US Civil Defense Program in Historical Perspective (Prepared for Federal Emergency
Management Agency: April 1981), 520.
^ Guy Oakes, The Imaginary War: American Civil Defense and American Cold War Culture
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), 38.
Executive Office o f the President, National Security Resources Board, United States Civil
Defense (Washington: GPO, 1950), 2.

II

planners’ recognition that money for defense was largely directed toward active
measures, such as weapons building and the development o f early warning systems.
While the focus on the family may have been a pragmatic solution for NSRB planners
because o f their limited funds, it also reflected the concurrent shift in American culture
toward the nuclear family.
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Figure 2— The National Civil Defense pattern from the NSRB's United States Civil Defense Program

United States Civil Defense Program and other materials produced by the FCDA
identified a clear intended audience. Preparedness efforts focused on suburban nuclear
families while ignoring Americans in urban areas. By emphasizing a program o f selfhelp in which individual families purchased items meant to aid in their survival at local
stores, the FCDA connected consumption and patriotism. Despite ongoing internal
conflict at the FCDA between the message that survival was possible and a recognition
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that most efforts at preparedness would prove futile, the administration produced a
consistent stream of materials for public consumption that held that American families
could survive an atomic attack by practicing self-help measures. Examining the public
information campaigns o f the FCDA reveals one way that civil defense contributed to the
hegemony of the Cold War consensus.
A desire to create a consensus developed in the late 1940s and business,
policymakers, and the mass media united to indoctrinate Americans about the “benefits
of the American way of life.”^"* They framed the American system o f free enterprise in
opposition to the Soviet totalitarianism and linked democracy with affluence. The
concept o f consensus also attempted to ascribe narrow gender roles for men and women,
define acceptable public discourse, and located autonomy for Americans in their role as
consumers in the free market. These groups saw this consensus as the foundation for
ever-growing American affluence and power and as the key to an “egalitarian and
harmonious s o c i e t y . T h e public information campaigns were used to educate
Americans about their role in this consensus-driven society. The cynical response of
Americans to many of the FCDA’s efforts suggests that the consensus o f the postwar
period was more imagined than lived.
Even after the creation o f the FCDA at the federal level in 1950, civil defense
planning remained primarily a local issue. Official federal policy held that responsibility
for preparedness belonged to individual states. The federal role was one o f “planning,
coordination, and guidance,” while the states were the responsible for the operation of

Daniel Horowitz, The Anxieties o f Affluence: Critiques o f American Consumer Culture, 19391979 (Amherst; University o f Massachusetts Press, 2004), 7.
Ibid.
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civil defense/^ Since the federal role was limited to such hands-off duties, it allowed the
FCDA to focus most o f their efforts on public education campaigns and to promote civil
defense mainly as a project of self-help to Americans. These public education campaigns
took the form o f booklets, pamphlets, television and radio spots, posters, and exhibits.
Distributed by the FCDA to local civil defense offices and the public, these materials
presented a consistent message aimed at suburban families that survival was possible and
that their participation in civil defense would lead to a stronger America.
Two objectives guided the FCDA’s public education campaign. The first
objective, “To develop a general acceptance o f civil defense as a necessary, permanent
element o f our total national defense, without hysteria and independent o f the ups and
downs of international relations” attempted to orient civil defense as a permanent part of
American society.^^ A focus on citizens’ responsibility was the core o f the second
objective as it aimed to “to produce a sober, routine readiness in all American families,
based on indoctrination and public exercises, to the point where prompt and effective
survival action becomes automatic.”^® These objectives led to two distinct goals for civil
defense planners. First, policymakers aimed for preparedness planning independent of
international politics. The second objective, indoctrination, became the main focus as the
FCDA attempted to convert the domestic homefront into a Cold W ar battlefield. Lack o f
funds and little interest in the program by politicians limited the ability o f the FCDA to
reach either objective.

Federal Civil Defense Administration, 1952 Annual Report, (Washington: GPO, 1953), 1.
Federal Civil Defense Administration, 1955 Annual Report, (Washington; GPO, 1956), 72.
Ibid.
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In order to instruct Americans about their role in civil defense the FCDA entered
into a number of partnerships. Officials on the national level worked with newspapers,
magazines, television, and radio to spread the message that survival was possible. The
FCDA lauded these relationships and claimed that “making the facts o f survival
understood, believed, and remembered by millions o f Americans” would have been
impossible without the participation o f mass media.^^ The partnerships the FCDA
formed with the mass media largely determined the scope and content o f preparedness
information.
The FCDA issued booklets, pamphlets, and other publications to educate the
public about their role in civil defense. Materials for the general public emphasized the
policy o f self-help in ensuring survival o f families. The majority o f publications focused
on families at home and paid little attention to the very real possibility that family
members might be apart at the time o f attack. While these materials focused on the
survival o f the atomic bomb blast with little attention to post-blast society, materials
produced for professional groups focused on the real devastation o f a post-attack city.
The divergence in the messages o f these two types o f publications is important because
the level o f destruction presented for public consumption is significantly lower than that
presented to those responsible for recovery efforts. Examining the publications o f the
FCDA reveal important insight into the ideology o f the administration and the ways they
married the notion o f family survival with victory for the United States in World War III.
Shortly after the establishment o f the FCDA, the administration began producing
materials for American families on the importance o f practicing good civil defense within

Federal Civil Defense Administration, 1952 Annual Report, (Washington; GPO, 1953), 41.
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their homes. These publications reiterated the policy o f self-help and encouraged
families to take steps needed to ensure their survival and help create a strong America.
Nearly all FCDA publications also carried the message that preparedness could deter a
Soviet attack because the population would recover quickly and defeat the communists.
Civil defense publications often featured families on the cover and detailed steps for each
member in preparing for a possible attack.®** In these pamphlets, the dangers of atomic
attack were downplayed, and American families were guaranteed survival by completing
basic preparedness measures. One example o f such pamphlets. Six Steps to Survival,
featured a family on the cover and asked, “If an Enemy Attacked Today Would You
Know What to Do?”®’ Inside, the FCDA listed six steps for survival; prepare family for
emergencies, learn civil defense signals, know CONELRAD stations, follow the
evacuation guide, construct a home shelter, and read about fallout. On the back cover,
the same family stood secure in their knowledge that they were prepared to survive an
atomic attack. Other materials drove home the message that survival planning for
families was not only important to protect them in case of an atomic attack, but in making
America stronger. One example. What You Can Do Now, contained the civil defense
pledge and explicitly made the case on the front cover with an image o f the family
reading the pamphlet accompanied by the text, “for a stronger America.”®^ FCDA
publications for the public focused on the family as the core o f civil defense. Pamphlets
such as these “stressed the metaphoric bond between self and nation” and equated the
Examples include Federal Civil Defense Administration, Before D isaster Strikes: What to Do
Know About Emergency Sanitation at Home, (Washington; GPO, 1953); Home Protection Exercises,
(Washington; GPO, \95€), Rural Family Defense, (Washington; GPO, 1956), and Corner Room Shelter fo r
Family Protection in an Atomic Attack, (Washington; GPO, 1953).
Federal Civil Defense Administration, Six Steps to Survival, (Washington; GPO, 1956).
Federal Civil Defense Administration, What You Can Do Now, (Washington; GPO, 1956).
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survival o f the family with the victory o f the United States in the Cold War.®® The
equation o f middle-class families with a Cold War victory in these publications, with
their focus on suburban families, consisting o f parents and a son and daughter, illustrate
one way that the messages of the FCDA helped inform the consensus o f the period.
The FCDA created materials with messages catered to the intended audience. In
addition to the campaigns aimed at American families, the FCDA produced publications
meant for groups such as clergy, doctors, dentists, welfare professionals, and the police.
Most o f these materials carried a bleak message about the realities o f atomic attack and
the need for trained professionals to tend to the masses following an attack.®"* These
publications stand in stark contrast to the optimistic message that survival was possible
offered in materials meant for the general population.
Comparing these two types o f materials illustrates an important contradiction in
FCDA policy. A pamphlet meant for those responsible for post-attack society. The
Welfare Task in Civil Defense, had a particularly grim cover.®^ Against the backdrop o f a
mushroom cloud, a long line o f people streamed out a destroyed town on the front cover.
At the front o f a line, a man carried a child while another child walked in front o f him
carrying a baby. The people’s clothing hung in shreds around them. This drawing o f the

Robert A. Jacobs, “There are No Civilians; We Are All at War’: Nuclear War Shelter and
Survival Narratives During the Early Cold War,” Journal o f American Culture 30:4, 401.
Examples include: Federal Civil Defense Administration, Before Disaster Strikes: What the
Farmer Should Know About Biological Warfare (Washington: GPO, 1955); FCDA, 10 Steps to Industrial
Survival (Washington: GPO, 1956); Federal Civil Defense Administration, Basic Course in Emergency
Mass Feeding (Washington: GPO, 1957); the Federal Civil Defense Administration also produced booklets
for various professionals including doctors, dentists, veterinarians, fire fighters, and engineers.
Federal Civil Defense Administration, The Welfare Task in Civil Defense. (Washington: GPO,
1953). Federal Civil Defense Administration, “For Your Information: Public Affairs #60: The Welfare
Task in Civil Defense,” May 22, 1953; James M. Lambie Records (Lambie Records); Box 3, Civil Defense
- General 1953 (2), DDEL. A press release described “The Welfare Task” as “a pictorial -text
representation o f the four components o f CD-emergency services— mass care, registration and information,
temporary rehabilitation aid, and evacuation.”
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destruction o f an atomic bomb is in direct conflict with other messages offered by the
FCDA for public consumption. A pamphlet meant for the general public published in
1955, Facts About Fallout, showed a much rosier picture o f post-attack America.^^ On
the cover o f that pamphlet, a man stood in front o f a mushroom cloud holding his
briefcase with a bewildered look, but the cover does not convey nearly the same level of
destruction or suffering as The Welfare Task in Civil Defense. The two covers both show
an America that has just been the target o f an atomic bomb with the mushroom cloud still
lingering in the background, but the stark contrast in the level o f destruction points to the
differing messages for the general public and those meant to respond to an attack. The
very different scenes o f post-attack American shown on these two covers demonstrate the
tension inherent in the FCDA’s public information mission. Two important concepts
guided civil defense planners: the official line that claimed Americans could survive an
attack while privately they recognized the futility o f civil defense e f f o r t s . T h i s tension
manifest itself in the dramatically different covers; civil defense informational materials
meant for public consumption offered a carefully cultivated optimistic message that
cleaved to the notion that survival was possible, while those meant for individuals meant
to aid in the recovery effort recognized the very real danger o f atomic attack.

Federal Civil Defense Administration, Facts About Fallout, (Washington: GPO, 1955).
Interestingly, this was published in 1955, after the government released information about the very real
dangers o f fallout, but neither the cover nor the text inside acknowledges the harmful effects o f fallout.
Oakes, 7-8.
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Figure 3- The Welfare Task in Civil Defense, 1953

Figure 4- Facts about Fallout, 1955

In addition to the publication and distribution o f informational materials, civil
defense officials created a number o f campaigns in partnership with various companies
and manufacturers to educate the public. In such cooperative campaigns, the civil
defense message appeared in space donated by businesses, publishers, or in buildings.
The non-profit Advertising Council created a series o f public-service campaigns to raise
awareness o f civil defense measures. That campaign is examined in the next chapter.
Not only did the FCDA rely on the might o f the Ad Council to sell the message o f
preparedness, but the administration also encouraged private companies to take part in
the effort. Officials asked stores that sold products related to civil defense to display
posters about volunteer recruitment. The FCDA requested that companies manufacturing
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preparedness products to include information about the official civil defense program in
advertising materials. Such encouragement created conflict within the FCDA, however,
as technical planners expressed concern about the accuracy o f claims and messages made
in private ads.^^ The Administration also partnered with manufacturers to spread its
message in more unusual ways. One example was the insertion o f FCDA alert cards in
new wallets and billfolds by the producer o f these g o o d s . T h e s e campaigns
demonstrate the ingenuity of the FCDA in finding new ways to reach the public. This
cooperation may not have been the first choice of officials, but their anemic budget made
such creative promotion a necessity. Campaigns such as these bombarded Americans
with the message o f survival through preparedness in the marketplace.
Civil defense officials also used more graphical forms to spread the message of
survival. The Alert America exhibit in 1952 was by far the largest exhibition, but the
FCDA also created smaller exhibits that used a variety o f tools to educate Americans
about the need for civil defense including posters and maps showing potential destruction
under black lights for display at conventions, trade shows, fairs, and other events.'^*’
Additionally, the FCDA developed posters to aid in education and recruitment. Similar
in style to World War II posters, the FCDA commissioned two series of civil defense
posters in 1952. Officials meant for them to be displayed in a variety o f locations
including store windows, civil defense offices, theater lobbies, factory corridors, and

Letter by Ed Lyman, August 8, 1951; Quiek Files; Box 2, Civil Defense Program, HSTL.
Federal Civil Defense Administration, 1953 Annual Report, (Washington; GPO, 1954), 74.
This campaign differs from later efforts by private companies and businesses to impart civil defense
information to customers. The wallet card campaign was in partnership with the FCDA in contrast to the
later campaigns that were undertaken independently by companies.
40
Produces Variety o f Exhibits for Public,” Civil Defense Alert, August 1952, 2. Federal
Civil Defense Administration, 1952 Annual Report, (Washington: GPO, 1953), 52. Federal Civil Defense
Administration, 1953 Annual Report, (Washington: GPO, 1954), 74.
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television backdrops. When displayed as a unit the posters formed a forty-foot narrative
about the need for civil defense.'*' The first series, “Alert America,” consisted o f twelve
posters that told the “basic civil defense s t o r y . P o s t e r messages included: “Enemy
Target n o .l- Civilians,” “To Win- the enemy must smash our production,” “Make no
mistake-civilians can be bombed,” “ 150 Million Alert Americans are a mighty force for
peace,” and “Your vigilance is the price o f your freedom.” The second series consisted
of ten posters focused on the recruitment o f volunteers. Each one highlighted a different
activity and encouraged Americans to join the important civil defense effort. Jobs listed
included post-attack welfare and health service and police and fire rescue. The FCDA
reported that they distributed 40,000 sets o f the posters.'*^ Posters offered a valuable
resource for civil defense officials because they were relatively inexpensive to produce
and quickly communicated their message. Just as World War II posters called on every
American to take part in the war effort through activities like buying war bonds and
planting victory gardens, the “Alert America” series o f posters called on citizens to
become the front-line troops o f the Cold War. One poster, “ 150 Million Alert Americans
are a mighty force for peace,” told Americans that their participation in civil defense
could serve as a deterrent to Soviet attack and prevent World War III. FCDA officials,
many o f whom came from the World War II Office o f War Information, skillfully crafted
posters to compel Americans to volunteer for civil defense. These posters clearly
invoked the Cold War and contrasted the opportunity o f American capitalism with the

“FCDA Produces Variety o f Exhibits for Public,” Civil Defense Alert, August 1952, 2.
Federal Civil Defense Administration, “The Federal Civil Defense Administration presents
Signs o f Our Times,” (Washington; GPO, 1952); Lambie Records; Box 3, Civil Defense - General 1953
(2), DDEL.
Federal Civil Defense Administration, 1952 Annual Report, (Washington: GPO, 1953), 53.
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oppression o f Soviet communism. One o f the most striking posters, “Enemy Target no.
1- Civilians,” showed an iron fist crushing an American town complete with factories and
homes. The poster explicitly showed viewers that the home front was no longer safe
from enemy attack and that American families must take an active role to ensure a strong
America. The other posters in the series carried similar themes. Driving home the
message that total war was an imminent possibility, these posters illustrate the real unease
of the early Cold War.

Figure 5- 1952 Poster from the Federal Civil Defense Administration
Harry S. Truman Presidential Library and Museum
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The FCDA saw popular press magazines as another avenue to reach the public.
Officials wrote editorials and other content for the magazines. Bylines for the articles
varied; they were sometimes attributed to the FCDA, but also appeared as content
generated by the magazine, or as a public service article. One example appeared in 1953
when Val Peterson, then head o f the FCDA, wrote an article for C ollier’s magazine,
“Panic: The Ultimate Weapon?” Widely read, the FCDA republished it and sent it out
from their offices.'*'* Other magazines including Life, Newsweek, Redbook, Saturday
Evening Post, and Time, heeded the call o f the FCDA and published positive articles
about US civil defense. The FCDA sent out a kit, “The Ever Present Danger,” to
magazine editors asking them to support the campaign. In a letter accompanying the kit.
Acting Administrator Wadsworth o f the FCDA claimed, “Civil Defense stands as a co
equal partner with the military defense. If both are sufficiently strong— they can help
stave off World War III.”'*^ The kit included items he hoped editors would “find it
possible to use” in “many future issues” including “quotable quotes” on civil defense
from military and political leaders, suggested editorials, fillers, slogans, and a fact sheet
on the program.'*® The position o f the FCDA expressed in the kit, that civil defense stood
as a co-equal partner to military defense, failed to take hold in mainstream media, but
editors did regularly publish features extolling readers to volunteer for civil defense and
prepare their homes and families. The distribution o f “The Ever Present Danger” and the

Val Peterson, “Panic, the Ultimate Weapon?” Collier’s, August 21, 1953, 99; “‘Panic’ Article
Available as Booklet,” For Your Information, newsletter o f the FCDA, December 28, 1953.
Federal Civil Defense Administration, “The Ever Present Danger; A Magazine Program for the
Self-Protection o f the American People through Civil Defense,” Lambie Records; Box 3, Civil Defense General 1953 (2), DDEL.
Ibid.
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willingness of magazine publishers to devote space to the message that with preparation
an atomic bomb could be survived helped to inject civil defense as part o f postwar
American discourse in a way that pamphlets from the local or national civil defense
office could not.
The FCDA recognized the power o f television in reaching Americans as
television ownership increased dramatically in the 1950s. The FCDA distributed footage
from atomic bomb tests at the Nevada Test Site to further the message o f self-help as the
key to survival.'*^ The Advertising Council sponsored live coverage o f the 1953 test
program “to alert citizens to the need for civilian defense activities, the donation o f blood
for civilian emergency stockpiles and stimulation o f the Ground Observer Corps.”'*® The
FCDA applauded the live coverage because it “brought home to millions o f Americans
not only the tremendous destructive force o f an atomic blast, but also offered visual proof
that a family can survive by taking simple precautions.”'*^ In addition to the live footage,
the FCDA collaborated with film production companies to distribute films summarizing
the test program.^® The FCDA cooperated with “private industry, foundations, and trade
associations in the production o f sponsored public service films on civil defense.”^*
These sponsored films followed the “cooperative promotion” model o f the FCDA and
furthered the association between official civil defense efforts and the marketplace. The
FCDA provided educational films about civil defense to television stations. One such

'*’ Federal Civil Defense Administration, 1953 Annual Report, (Washington: GPO, 1954), 70 and
74 .
Advertising Council, Annual Report, 1952-53, (New York: Advertising Council, 1953), 6.
Federal Civil Defense Administration, 1953 Annual Report, (Washington: GPO, 1954), 74.
Ibid., 73.
Ibid., 73.
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program, “Survival,” by the FCDA played to an estimated 12 million viewers in 1951.®^
Television stations also ran one-minute promotional spots for civil defense that featured
celebrities such as Lucille Ball, George Bums, and Jack Benny/^ Civil defense planners
used television in order to infiltrate American homes with the message o f survival. This
emphasis on television dovetailed with “the installation [of television] into domestic
space in the years following World W ar II.”®'* Television producers and civil defense
policymakers largely imagined the same audience for their productions: the suburban,
white middle class. Reflecting planner’s assumption that the suburban middle class was
their primary audience for public education, they linked preparedness with two other
important trends o f the era, consumption and togetherness, through television.
While the FCDA devoted significant attention to magazine and television, they
also developed content for use on the radio. Radio material primarily consisted o f brief
spots educating Americans about the need for civil defense. The ABC radio network
aired weekly spots on civil defense awareness.®® Radio stations carried advertisements
promoting the program voiced by stars such as Bing Crosby, Amos and Andy, and Art
Linkletter.®® The FCDA, through the Ad Council, provided stations a “Radio Fact Sheet”
with talking points on the civil defense program and directions to “indicate that an air

An ad promoting the program was sent to stations across the country asking them to book the
program “Civil Defense Offers Survival,” Quick Files; Box 6, Civil Defense Campaign - General (1),
HSTL. See also Paul Boyer’s discussion o f the program Paul Boyer, By the B om b’s Early Light: American
Thought and Culture at the Dawn o f the Atomic Age (New York: Pantheon, 1985), 325.
Federal Civil Defense Administration, 1955 Annual Report, (Washington: GPO, 1956), 78.
Lynn Spigel, Make Room fo r TV: Television and the Family Ideal in Postwar America
(Chicago: University o f Chicago Press, 1992), 1.
Federal Civil Defense Administration, 1953 Annual Report, (Washington: GPO, 1956), 71.
Federal Civil Defense Administration, 1955 Annual Report, (Washington: GPO, 1956), 76.
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attack

be survived” and a caution to avoid “scare copy.”®’ In the mid-1950s, the

FCDA’s interest in radio shifted into the implementation o f the CONELRAD emergency
broadcast system.
FCDA-issued publications as well as the cooperative campaigns in magazines,
radio, and television all carried the same underlying message that an atomic attack could
be survived through family-based preparation. The survival o f American families was
identified as victory for the United States in the Cold War. The slogan o f the FCDA,
“Survive, Recover, and Win,” implied that the administration was concerned with both
survival and recovery, but the majority o f public information campaigns focused solely
on survival as the key to victory. The FCDA, by framing civil defense as an individual
effort, helped connect the Cold W ar to everyday American domestic experiences like
shopping, house cleaning, and food preparation. The optimistic message o f the FCDA
lived on beyond the pages of their booklets as the emphasis on self-help and the family
informed discussions about survival until 1963.

Radio Fact Sheet, no. 54, Advertising Council; Lambie Records; Box 3, Civil Defense General 1953 (1), Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Library (DDEL).
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CHAPTER 3

A TOUGH SELL: THE ADVERTISING COUNCIL
AND CIVIL DEFENSE
Just months after its establishment as an independent agency, the Federal Civil
Defense Administration contracted with the Advertising Council to promote their cause.
The partnership was fraught with tension and the campaign never reached the prominence
o f some o f the Ad Council’s other public service efforts. Examining the relationship
between the FCDA, the Ad Council, and the executive branch reveals several tensions
that determined the nature of civil defense promotion in the 1950s. A close reading of
the advertisements created by the Ad Council exposed many o f the beliefs planners held
about civil defense, including who the perceived constituents for preparedness were and
what survival and victory would look like for the United States.
The history o f the Advertising Council and civil defense has two important
strains: the relationship between the FCDA and the Ad Council and the evolution o f the
campaigns developed by the Ad Council. The working relationship between the Ad
Council and the FCDA was tense from the beginning o f their partnership. The
involvement o f the White House public affairs division further strained the relationship.
The tension originated from a fundamental disagreement about how the civil defense
campaign should best be sold to the American public. The Advertising Council argued
for a campaign that called for concrete action based on their expert knowledge of
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advertising theory. The FCDA wanted a campaign that increased awareness o f civil
defense and enhanced the reputation o f civil defense workers and volunteers. Both the
FCDA and the Ad Council saw these two approaches as fundamentally incompatible.
Executives at the Ad Council took offense at the FCDA’s insistence that they knew better
how to sell preparedness. The second strain, the content o f the Advertising Council
campaigns for civil defense, illustrates a number o f important themes that were used in
selling survival. Close reading o f the advertisements show how the Ad Council and the
FCDA conceptualized civil defense as the ads consistently relied on anti-communist
sentiment and images o f home and family to stimulate interest in preparedness. While
the partnership between the Ad Council and the FCDA lasted only five years, it
influenced later efforts by private groups to promote civil defense. The difficulties in
their relationship also reveal important debates that took place outside o f the public eye
about the meaning of civil defense in postwar America.
Formed originally in 1941, the Advertising Council worked with the Office o f
W ar Information during World War II to create advertisements for rationing, war bonds,
victory gardens, and other domestic programs meant to support the war effort. After the
American victory in W orld War II, the Council remained a force in American culture and
politics and created campaigns focused on American victory in the Cold War.®® Leaders
of the Council summed up their feelings on their role in post-World War II America by

Secondary literature on the Advertising Council is surprisingly lacking. The main scholarship
on the Ad Council is; Robert Griffith, “The Selling o f America: The Advertising Council and American
Politics, 1942-1960,” Business History Review, 57, No. 3 (1983), 388-412; Robert Jackall and Janice M.
Hirota, The Image Makers: Advertising, Public Relations, and the Ethos o f Advocacy (Chicago: University
o f Chicago Press, 2000); Daniel Lykins, From Total War to Total Diplomacy: The Advertising Council and
the Construction o f the Cold War Consensus (Westport: Praeger Publishers, 2003); and Robert H. Zieger,
“The Paradox o f Plenty: The Advertising Council and the Post-Sputnik Crisis,” Advertising and Society
Review 4:1 (2003).
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saying, “The war never stopped. Only the enemy has changed.”®^ Their 1950-51 Annual
Report traced the history of the Ad Council’s as dealing with the problems o f “war,
peace, and semi-war.”®® This quote shows the important arc o f the Ad Council over these
years as they moved from their origin during World War II, to a focus on reconversion
during the peace between 1945 and 1950, and finally their view that once again they were
engaged in a semi-war with their involvement in domestic campaigns related to the Cold
War. Over the course o f the 1950s, the Advertising Council developed many new public
service campaigns. The Ad Council’s main energies in the first years o f the 1950s
focused on the related campaigns of promoting free enterprise and educating Americans
about the Cold War.®'
“Deeply aware o f the serious injury a surprise enemy attack could do to our
national strength and ability,” FCDA officials asked the Advertising Council to take on
the cause o f civil defense in 1951.®’ The Council agreed and assigned the campaign to
the advertising firm o f Batten, Barton, Durstine, and Osbom (BBD&O), with Edward
Gerbic of Johnson and Johnson as the volunteer coordinator.®® The staff of the
Advertising Council functioned as a go-between for the FCDA, the White House Public
Affairs Office, and the advertising executives who actually designed the campaign
materials. Advertising Council staff constantly had to mediate between the different

“Matters o f Choice,” 10. From www.adcouncil.org. last accessed 7-May-07.
Advertising Council, Annual Report, 1950-51, (New York: Advertising Council, 1951), 3.
“Matters o f Choice,” 41. Some o f the main campaigns in the early 1950s were care packages to
European countries ravaged in World War II, blood drives, get out the vote, blood drives, and brotherhood.
See also, “Ad Council Where it Came In,” Business Week, October II, 1952, 136-8.
Advertising Council, Annual Report, 1951-52, (New York: Advertising Council, 1952), 24.
Ibid. Batten, Barton, Durstine, and Osbom (BBD&O) founded in early part o f the twentieth
century became one o f the most important advertising agencies, pioneering campaigns for such large
companies as Ford and Pepsi.
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interests o f the White House Public Affairs Office and the FCDA, and nearly always took
the side o f the executive branch. For example, they reduced size o f the campaigns
despite regular pleading by the FCDA for larger campaigns in order to appease the
desires o f the White House. The constant compromise led to campaigns for civil defense
that were dramatically smaller in scope and content than imagined by the FCDA.
The relationship between the FCDA and the Advertising Council got off to a
rocky start. A memorandum about a meeting on April 24, 1951 referred to the attitude of
the FCDA’s public affair director. Jack DeChant, as “antagonistic.”®'* This tension
contributed to delays in communication and misunderstandings throughout the next five
years o f their partnership. Though the relationship was not helped by personality
conflicts between FCDA officials and Ad Council staff, the real source o f the tension was
more the fundamental difference in opinions on the best way to market civil defense. The
Advertising Council’s position reflected the larger American skepticism toward civil
defense. Further, the failure o f both the Truman and Eisenhower administrations to
embrace fully the cause o f civil defense left the FCDA to scramble for funding
throughout the 1950s. Ad Council executives recognized that without support o f the
White House, the FCDA could not possibly attain the level o f prestige FCDA officials
wanted. These difficulties led to a strained relationship between the two groups.
Correspondence between the Ad Council, the FCDA, and the White House address much
of this tension and reveal the ways it limited the possibilities for a continued relationship
between the two groups.

Allan Wilson to Charles Jackson, August 14, 1951; Quick Files; Box 6, Civil Defense
Campaign- Correspondence, 1951-53, HSTL.
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While neither President Truman nor Eisenhower took an interest in fully funding
civil defense, both administrations’ public affairs divisions took an interest in the public
materials distributed by the FCDA. Their interest repeatedly interfered with the aims o f
the FCDA. Charles Jackson o f the White House Public Affairs Office killed the FCDA’s
dream for a large campaign based on his belief that advertising was most effective when
it demanded concrete action from the reader such as buying a particular product. He
went on to tell the FCDA that they could not recommend a campaign “which has as its
sole objective ‘alert America’.” We have to suggest something for the reader to do.”®®
The opposing positions o f the FCDA and the White House Public Affairs Office point to
two very different understanding o f what the nature of civil defense ought to be during
the early 1950s. Just as the FCDA constantly struggled to stay afloat with its paltry
budget, the lack of support from the White House Public Affairs Office shows just how
little faith the Executive branch placed in civil defense during the first half o f the decade.
In addition to the differing opinions about the appropriate scope o f the civil
defense campaign, the Ad Council and FCDA debated the most effective forms of
advertisements. Composed of members from some of the biggest advertising agencies in
America, the Ad Council had a clear idea o f what made advertisements compelling. The
FCDA also had determined what types of advertisements they deemed most effective at
selling civil defense and desired a large campaign focused on increasing awareness about
preparedness efforts. FCDA officials viewed the reluctance o f the Advertising Council to
embark on a large prestige campaign for civil defense as a personal rebuff, when it more
accurately reflected a difference in ideology about effective advertising.

Memorandum Charles Jackson to James M. Lambie, April 15, 1953; Lambie Records; Box 3,
CD Civil Defense - Campaign - Correspondence 1953 (1), DDEL.
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Once the Ad Council, the FCDA, and the White House Public Affairs Office
came to a compromise about the best form and scale for the civil defense campaign, a
new conflict emerged about the actual content o f the advertisements. The Advertising
Council rejected the optimism o f the FCDA’s public information campaign and saw civil
defense as a grim reality o f the Atomic Age. FCDA officials conversely believed that the
cause o f civil defense ought to be one o f long-term importance, independent o f the
international climate. J.M. Chambers o f the FCDA public affairs office wrote to Allan
Wilson o f the Ad Council about the way civil defense ought to be promoted. He said, “If,
instead o f keeping people in a perpetual state of alert, we try to sell civil defense on a
calm, long-range, common sense basis, we must convince people that what the nation
should strive for is not merely to build a military machine but to achieve total national
security.”®® The Ad Council did not believe that their efforts could aid in building long
term support for the cause. Ed Gerbic, the coordinator o f the campaign, argued that there
was little that could be done through the Ad Council to help the FCDA or enhance the
reputation o f civil defense workers.®’ The White House agreed with the Advertising
Council’s stance that they could do little to aid the cause and encouraged the FCDA to
seek partnerships with those who sold civil defense products to help in that endeavor.®®
The Ad Council and the FCDA could not compromise their difference on the content o f
the campaign and it led to a limited effort by the Ad Council on behalf o f civil defense.
Understanding the conflict between the FCDA, the Truman and Eisenhower

^ J.M. Chambers to Allan Wilson, February 27, 1953; Lambie Records; Box 3, Civil Defense General 1953 (1), DDEL.
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32

administrations, and the Ad Council provides important background to the campaigns
that were mounted on behalf o f civil defense. These campaigns, despite the behind-thescenes fighting, consciously made a case for preparedness that relied on an implicit, and
in some cases explicit, connection between civil defense and good citizenship.
Despite the squabbling between the Ad Council and the FCDA, BBD&O moved
quickly on creating a campaign for civil defense once the two agencies reached a
compromise. This first campaign centered on volunteer recruitment. FCDA officials
thought o f it as the begirming saying, “It will have to be followed— or rather, dovetail
into— a long-range campaign to sell civil defense as a permanent part o f community
planning, of which advertising admittedly could not be expected to carry the full load.”®^
While the FCDA saw the recruitment campaign as only a start, the Ad Council and the
White House Public Affairs Office viewed it as a sufficient effort to educate people about
the need for civil defense. Civil defense officials asked the Ad Council and White House
for support for a larger, more prestigious campaign over the next three years, but were
denied each time. The desire o f civil defense planners to create a much larger campaign
partly represented their mandate to educate the public, but also points to a very different
conception of civil defense than that o f the White House and Congress. The FCDA
conceived o f civil defense as an ongoing effort, independent o f larger political issues.
This view failed to take hold outside the FCDA as the Advertising Council’s limited
interest in the cause suggests.
The Volunteer Recruitment campaign went live shortly after its creation by
BBD&O. Radio spots for civil defense aired between April-July o f 1951 on programs

^ Memorandum o f meeting between FCDA public affairs and Advertising Council: “Preliminary
run-through o f BBD&O materials,” May 29, 1951; Quick Files; Box 2, Civil Defense Program, HSTL.
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such as Boxing Bouts, Rogue’s Gallery, and the Gene Autry show with such sponsors as
General Mills, Gillette Safety Razor, and Proctor and Gamble among other companies.’®
The development of these public service ads established a link between preparedness
education and the marketplace that remained throughout the decade. Even once the
Advertising Council severed ties with the FCDA, companies continued to provide space
to educate the public about survival. Radio allocations for the campaign ended abruptly,
however, when Ad Council executives, frustrated with the slow movement o f the FCDA
on approving the newspaper mat portion of the recruitment campaign debated the
effectiveness o f the radio spots.’ * The end o f the Ad Council radio program, due largely
to the frustration of the Ad Council with the FCDA, reveals the way that the inter-agency
tension hindered the civil defense campaign.
The momentum o f the campaign was further crippled when the Ad Council
denied requests for car cards for the civil defense campaign. Car cards, printed posters
usually eleven by twenty-eight inches, were placed on busses, trains, and other modes of
public transportation.’® Both public service and commercial advertisers used car cards to
reach the public. Ed Gerbic, the volunteer coordinator for the campaign, wrote to Charles
Jackson o f the White House Public Affairs Office that the civil defense campaign had
been discouraging and further quashed the FCDA’s hopes for a larger campaign saying,
“We feel certain that a national prestige campaign or a campaign designed to sell Civil
Defense as an established way o f life would have little or no chance for support by the
industries and organizations that would have to finance the ads, in view o f the present
™Ibid.
Advertising Council, “Report o f Civil Defense Campaign for 1951,” Jan. 15,1952; Lambie
Records; Box 52, Advertising Council - Government Campaigns, DDEL.
Edward J. Rowse, Fundamentals o f Advertising (Cincinnati: Southwestern, 1950), 265.
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national climate.”’® The Ad Council explicitly rejected the notion o f the FCDA that civil
defense ought to be an ongoing part o f life for the United States and instead focused their
efforts on campaigns they felt were more relevant to the current political climate. The
campaigns o f the Ad Council changed swiftly to reflect changing times and rarely did
campaigns continue beyond a few-year span.’'*
Following the distribution o f the Volunteer Recruitment kit, The FCDA requested
that the Advertising Council create a more prominent campaign for civil defense
awareness. So-called “prestige campaigns” were used mainly to boost the reputation o f a
cause or an organization.’® A prestige campaign would enhance the reputation o f civil
defense volunteers and workers and would take place on a much larger scale than the
recruitment campaign. In November o f 1951, the Advertising Council rejected the idea
saying that a prestige campaign’s “Pollyanna-like character that did not befit the
seriousness, not to say the grimness, o f FCDA’s responsibilities.”’® Rebuffs such as
these went against the FCDA’s own message civil defense ought to be a national priority
no matter the international climate and certainly against the measured optimism o f their
own materials. At the end o f 1951, the Advertising Council recommended that the civil
defense campaign be held in abeyance and focused their efforts on other campaigns such
as Better Schools, American Economic System, Student Nurse Recruitment, and Prevent

Edward Gerbic to Charles W. Jackson, August 3, 1951; Quick Files; Box 2, Civil Defense
Program, HSTL.
Well-known campaigns such as Prevent Forest Fires and the American Red Cross are
exceptions to this rule. Most Ad Council campaigns lasted for only three years.
The main prestige campaigns the Ad Council took on were for the various branches o f the
armed forces. Quick Files; Box 1, Armed Forces - Prestige Campaign - Infantry, I95I; Armed Forces Prestige Campaign - WAC 1951, HSTL.
Memorandum o f meeting o f Advertising Council and BBD&O, Nov. 6, I95I; Quick Files; Box
2, Civil Defense Program, HSTL.
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Forest Fires.” The Civil Defense campaign continued on hold throughout 1952 as the
Ad Council questioned the need for the campaign, “it is in sort o f a limbo until a real
need for the Council’s aid reveals itself.”’®
During the break in the civil defense campaign, FCDA officials continued to
squabble with the Ad Council about how the concept o f civil defense could best be sold
to the American public. Henry Wehde from the Ad Council countered the FCDA’s
claims by saying that that they understood the importance o f civil defense “but in light of
what is good and effective advertising it was felt that the Council could produce, from the
standpoint of results and sponsorship, the most success on those programs which urge
concrete and simple actions rather than on those which have as their sole objective the
changing o f public conceptions.”’^ Wehde went on to say, “Thus it is our considered
opinion that although advertisements could most certainly be prepared to stress to the
consumer and business executive the importance and significance o f Civil Defense. Such
an ‘understanding’ campaign would not attract widespread sponsorship and not produce
appreciable results.”®® He concluded his letter by saying that the campaign for civil
defense ought only to be reactivated by the Council when the legislative and executive
branches “will lead the way into arousing public interest and confidence in Civil Defense
and when the FCDA can suggest simple and concise actions that advertising can urge

Advertising Council, “Report o f Civil Defense Campaign for 1951,” Jan. 15, 1952; Lambie
Records; Box 52, Advertising Council - Government Campaigns, DDEL; Advertising Council,
“Mobilization-Public Interest Campaigns,” October 1951; Files o f Charles W. Jackson (Jackson Files);
Box 16, Advertising Council Publications and General, HSTL.
Allan Wilson to Charles Jackson, Feb, 6. 1952; Quick Files; Box 6, Civil Defense CampaignCorrespondence, 1951-53, HSTL.
Henry Wehde to Spencer Quick, July 31, 1952; Quick Files; Box 6, Civil Defense CampaignIndustrial, HSTL. Most revealing are the comments handwritten on the letter, several points are
underlined with NUTS written next to them.
“ Ibid.
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upon the individual.”®' W ehde’s lengthy letter summarized the position o f the
Advertising Council. While the FCDA took offense at the Ad Council’s position, the
concerns o f the Council executives more accurately reflected the apathy o f the American
public at the time to the concept o f civil defense.
After realizing the limits o f the Ad Council’s interest in their cause, the FCDA
embraced the Volunteer Recruitment kit. The main portion o f the kit consisted o f a
newspaper mat campaign. A letter that accompanied the kit claimed, “recruiting is a job
for advertising and publicity.” ®®The bulk o f the kit consisted o f ads to be used in
newspapers and periodicals. The campaign stalled out, however, because, according to
Henry Wehde o f the Ad Council, “ 1952 was an election year and hence the policy o f the
federal government in regard to Civil Defense was somewhat fluid, it was the decision of
the Council’s task force with the full realization o f the importance o f this program, to
defer action until the situation stabilized.”®®
The contention surrounding the design o f the Volunteer Recruitment Kit set the
terms for the civil defense campaign. While such tension certainly colored the form of
the campaign, the real importance o f the campaign is in the messages the advertisements
set forth. The main goal of the campaign was recruitment o f volunteers, but the ads had
other aims as well. The ads all contained blatant anti-communist, pro-democracy
imagery. They also depicted a remarkably homogenous America, consisting solely o f
white, middle-class, suburban Americans. The ads included in the packet provide

Ibid.
^^Advertising Council, Civil Defense Volunteer Recruiting Kit, Federal Civil Defense
Administration,” Record Series 13/02/207, File #576, Advertising Council Archives, University o f Illinois
Archives.
Advertising Council, Annual Report, 1952-53, (New York: Advertising Council, 1953), 18.
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significant insight into the way civil defense officials imagined its constituency in the
early years of the Cold War. The underlying theme o f each o f the ads is an implicit, and
in some cases, explicit, connection between civil defense and good citizenship. For
example, a number o f ads included authority figures from the military with statements
about the importance o f preparation. Other ads used images o f servicemen to promote
the importance of home front preparedness. The main theme in the volunteer packet is
that civil defense ought to be carried out by individuals and their families, at home, and
that survival was possible with moderate preparation in case o f an atomic attack. Most
importantly, the fate of America rested squarely on the shoulders o f individual Americans
in all o f the ads.
One o f the ads included in the kit embodies a number of these themes. The ad
used images of three white, middle-class couples. The first image featured a sullen
couple, accompanied by the text, “Pessimists say, “W hat’s the use?” The second image
is o f a smiling couple, the optimists, who say, “W hat’s the Rush?” The third, and largest,
image on the page is of a man reading the newspaper, with his smiling wife beside him.
Underneath their picture the ad read, “Good citizens say, “How can we help?” The ad
played out many of themes o f civil defense during the early years o f the Cold War.
Preparedness was identified as an effort to be taken by yourself at home with your family.
A portion o f the text read, “The difference between preparedness and unpreparedness
could mean survival... for you, your family, your city... yes, even survival for
America.”®'*

^''Advertising Council, Civil Defense Volunteer Recruiting Kit, Federal Civil Defense
Administration,” Record Series 13/02/207, File #576, Advertising Council Archives, University o f Illinois
Archives.
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This advertisement neatly shows the ways in which the FCDA imagined its
constituency and the ways the message o f civil defense focused on the home as a crucial
site o f defense. All three couples appear to be middle-class and squarely fit into the
homogeneous world of civil defense. The youngest couple, the optimists, appears as
though they have yet to learn important lessons. Both the pessimists and good citizens
are middle-aged, but the good citizens are affluent and fashionable. The husband is
reading the newspaper, suggesting he stays well informed. The imagery o f the ad, with
the three couples in their own living rooms graphically reinforced the message that the
home front is the first line of defense in the Cold War. The good citizens pictured in
front o f their fireplace embody the best of America; they are educated, successful, and
realistic.
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Several ads in the Recruitment Kit used images o f women and family to showcase
the pressing need for civil defense awareness to defend America. Ads meant to appeal
specifically to women, however, offer a more complicated picture o f the relationship of
women to the broader civil defense program than identified by scholarship.®® One ad
featured a large image o f a married woman in a business suit wearing a civil defense
armband. The woman appears confident and serious. The text says, “There’s an
important job for every woman in civil defense.” Underneath the larger text are a series
of questions including, “Can you drive a car? Run an office? Cook?” The ad then goes
on to encourage women to donate time to local civil defense efforts. Beneath the large
image o f the woman, six smaller images recreate possible scenarios for civil defense
volunteers. The jobs represented are warden, nurse, welfare service, drivers, office staff,
and communications service.
This ad presents a more complicated relationship between women and civil
defense in the early years of the Cold W ar than allowed for in existing scholarship. The
ad differs from traditional accounts because while it appeals to women’s maternal
instincts, it allows women flexibility in their roles as wives and mothers to become
invaluable members o f the recovery effort. It also recalls many o f the important jobs
women took as paid labor during World War II. These images, rather than simply
marrying matemalism and the militarization o f American society, created additional
opportunities for women in civil defense outside o f childcare or nursing. Women,
according to this ad, are useful to civil defense because they are rational human beings.

The advertisement offers an important complication to the argument o f domestic containment
set forth by Elaine Tyler May’s Homeward Bound: American Families in the Cold War Era (New York:
Basic Books, 1988). May sees postwar culture using the Cold War and civil defense to define narrow roles
for women as mothers.
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not because o f any innate feminine capability. While other ads certainly used images of
family to stress the need for adequate defense, they largely included both men and
women, suggesting that instead o f a campaign to enlist mothers, civil defense was more
broadly a campaign to enlist families.
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Figure 7- Civil Defense Volunteer Recruitment Kit, 1951

The relationship between the FCDA and the Ad Council remained icy following
the release of the Volunteer Recruitment Kit. In 1952, the Ad Council approved another
civil defense campaign consisting solely of promotional materials for the Alert America
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convoy.®® The Alert America convoy traveled the nation in 1952 in an attempt to meet
the twin objectives o f the FCDA’s public education efforts by both educating Americans
about the need for civil defense and recruiting volunteers and is discussed in more detail
in the next chapter. The Advertising Council devoted their resources to other campaigns
such as “American Economic System,” “Armed Forces Blood Program,” “Prevent Forest
Fires,” “US Defense Bonds,” and “American Heritage.”®’ All o f these campaigns spread
important messages about America and used the language o f the Cold W ar to call for
domestic action. Most o f these campaigns have long since been forgotten, but the way
that they flooded the airwaves, billboards, and print media show how a particular image
of America was carefully constructed and codified during the postwar period. While the
civil defense campaign failed to gamer the level o f interest of some of other Ad Council
campaigns, it too spread important messages about the meaning o f America and the Cold
War.
In 1953, the tensions between the Advertising Council and the FCDA lessened
when the incoming Eisenhower administration replaced Jack DeChant as the FCDA
Public Affair director.®® The aims of the civil defense campaign also changed as it
moved away from volunteer recruitment and focused on first aid readiness for American
homes and industry.®^ This change is important as it moved the emphasis from direct
action, through volunteering, to a more passive form o f preparedness focused in one’s
^ Advertising Council, “Report o f Civil Defense Campaign for 1951,” Jan. 15, 1952; Lambie
Records; Box 52, Advertising Council - Government Campaigns, DDEL.
Advertising Council, “Mobilization-Public Interest Campaigns,” May 1952; Jackson Files; Box
15, Advertising Council- Monthly Summaries o f Activities [3 o f 3- November 1949-May 1952], HSTL.
** Status Report- July 1952-January 1953, Government Public Service Campaigns, Federal Civil
Defense Administration, Lambie Records; Box 3, Civil Defense - Campaign - Correspondence 1953 (2),
DDEL.
89

Advertising Council, Annual Report, 1953-54, (New York: Advertising Council, 1954), 18.
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own home. It also reflected in a broader downturn in the national discussion of civil
defense. BBD&O developed two newspaper kits to support the new campaign, A
Campaign to Save Lives if Disaster Strikes: H ere’s A Kit That Will Help You Protect The
People o f Your Community and A Campaign to Save Lives if Disaster Strikes: H ere’s a
Kit that Will Help Business and Industry Prepare fo r Disaster?^ The two new campaigns
did little to impart to Americans the crucial need for civil defense because o f the threat of
atomic war, and instead framed civil defense as a more general policy o f preparedness for
whatever disaster may come.
The new campaigns for civil defense were far different from the prestigious
campaign originally called for by the FCDA. The reactivation o f the civil defense
campaign focused on basic first aid and the maintenance o f a well-stocked medicine
cabinet with checklists o f products needed to insure survival. Much to the
disappointment o f the FCDA, the Ad Council conceived the campaign as one on a local
level with local sponsors, lacking the prestige o f other Ad Council campaigns.^’ The
First Aid kit began with letter to advertisers from Val Peterson that included a quote from
President Eisenhower that emphasized self-help as the first step o f survival saying, “The
first of these home exercises is perhaps the simplest and most necessary - having
adequate first aid supplies on hand and knowing how to use them through a free Red

^ Advertising Council, A Campaign to Save Lives if Disaster Strikes: H ere’s a K it that will help
you protect the people o f your community and A Campaign to Save Lives if Disaster Strikes: H ere’s a K it
that will help Business and Industry Prepare fo r Disaster, Record Series 13/02/207, File #671,
Advertising Council Archives, University o f Illinois Archives.
Advertising Council, “Call Report,” May 1, 1953; Lambie Records; Box 3, Civil Defense General 1953 (2), DDEL.
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Cross first aid course.”^^ Another letter in the kit from Ed Gerbic called on advertisers to
support the campaign saying, “Public apathy and indecision about civil defense is a
serious gap in America’s defense. They not only tempt an enemy to attack, but would
also increase the possibility that such an attack on our population and industrial might
would be devastating and decisive. A weak civil defense could lose us the peace... it
would lose us a war.”^^ One o f the most striking ads centered on a drawing o f a pencil.
Beneath the pencil the text read, “This pencil may save your life.” On the bottom, it
included a checklist o f products including bandages, antiseptic, and water purification
t a b l e t s . I n addition to the newspaper kit, the Advertising Council made the booklet.
Emergency Action to Save Lives available over drugstore c o u n t e r s . T h e book carried a
note on its back cover granting permission to any “responsible organization, institution,
individual, or concern which wishes to republish it for free distribution, legitimate
promotional purposes, or for sale.”^^ The first-aid campaign relied heavily on
sponsorships o f companies that produced the items called for on the checklist. This
campaign, for the first time, explicitly made a connection between manufacturers and
civil defense education. This connection caused anxiety within the FCDA, as they
debated whether or not to list medications by their brand names or their generic scientific
names, fearing the brand name would be seen as an endorsement o f the product. The
FCDA decided to use the generic names much to the displeasure o f storeowners who
^ Advertising Council, “A Campaign To Save Lives If Disaster Strikes; Here’s A Kit That Will
Help You Protect The People O f Your Community” (Washington: GPO, 1953); Lambie Records; Box 12,
Civil Defense - General 1958, DDEL.
"Ibid.

Advertising Coxmcil, Annual Report, 1953-54, (New York: Advertising Council, 1954), 18.
^ Federal Civil Defense Administration, Emergency Action to Save Lives, (Washington: GPO,
1951).

44

claimed difficulty in assisting customers in finding the products. While earlier public
service advertisements for civil defense appeared on donated space mainly in newspapers
or radio programs, they were not linked to a particular company or manufacturer that had
a monetary interest in preparedness. With the first aid campaign, the Ad Council and the
FCDA made deals with companies that had a financial interest in the purchase o f these
products. This relationship set the stage for later informational campaigns sponsored by
business and corporations that occurred outside the purview o f the FCDA, but sought to
educate the public, partially to gain goodwill but also to inspire the purchase o f their
product.
The move by the FCDA to an industrial campaign offered an important revision
of earlier campaigns that emphasized self-protection in the home. The campaign for
business and industry focused on the protection o f America’s vital industries and their
employees. The kit contained advertisements aimed at executives and stressed the need
for disaster p l a n n i n g . N e a r l y all the advertisements featured businessmen, ignorant to
the threat o f atomic attack. It connected America’s ongoing prosperity with industry. It
urged preparation by companies so that they could reopen soon after attack and their
contribution to America’s war effort.
By the mid-1950s, a new understanding o f fallout altered civil defense policy and
the FCDA realized the challenges inherent in promoting the new preparedness plans.
Policymakers recognized evacuation o f targeted cities as the best form o f civil defense,
but quickly realized that such a radical plan would have to be sold to the American

Advertising Council, A Campaign to Save Lives if Disaster Strikes: H e re’s A K it That Will Help
You Protect The People O f Your Community, (Washington: GPO, 1953); Lambie Records; Box 3, Civil
Defense - General 1953 (3), DDEL.
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public.^^ Even the FCDA conceded that it would be a tough sell because patterns of
fallout and evacuation routes would make standardized directions impossible.^^ The Ad
Council concurred and, for the first time, the two agencies agreed on the direction o f a
new campaign with materials focused on a “broad scale, national program, the purpose of
which would be to win public understanding of the threats we face and the defense
against them- and public participation in tests o f evacuation and other tactics which offer
our best chance o f survival if attack c o m e s . W h i l e the Ad Council and the FCDA
agreed on the goal of the campaign, the actual campaign produced by the Ad Council
tempered the idea somewhat and focused solely on the implementation of the
CONELRAD alert system. CONELRAD was developed in the early 1950s as a
comprehensive alert system and outlet for official civil defense instructions. The FCDA
saw a need to educate Americans to memorize the CONELRAD frequencies and to seek
it out in case o f an emergency. While the sudden harmony between the Ad Council and
the FCDA initially seems surprising, the change in philosophy for civil defense planning
fell more in line with the skills o f the Ad Council. With a shift toward evacuation and a
recognition that education campaigns would have to be localized, the FCDA was forced
to concede that the best campaign would have to aim for simple action. Instead o f any
kind o f large-scale prestige or awareness campaign, the new campaign focused simply on
awareness of the CONELRAD alert system.
CONELRAD reused many o f the same tropes present in the first large campaign
civil defense campaign, the Volunteer Recruitment kit. The packet contained a letter
^ Edward B. Lyman to Henry Wehde, October 20, 1954; Lambie Records; Box 12, Civil DefenseCorrespondence 1954, DDEL.
'"Ibid.
Ibid.
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from Val Peterson, the head o f the FCDA that held that “a strong America stands as a
barrier to aggression. A weak America would invite national suicide.” ' ”' The campaign
had as its aim “to impress on every citizen that if attack threatens he can find out where to
go and what to do by tuning in on the emergency frequencies o f 640 and 1240
kilocycles.”' ”^ The kit contained a number o f advertisements that linked the
CONELRAD broadcast with survival for American families. The most powerful ads
featured families coming under surprise attack and an admonishment to remember to turn
to the radio in times of emergency.
One o f the most visually striking advertisements created for the campaign
featured a family sitting around a kitchen table eating breakfast. The family consisted of
a father in a business suit, a boy, a girl, and a mother serving breakfast. As the family
enjoyed their breakfast, the ad implied that they are vulnerable to an attack. In the lower
right hand comer of the image, three planes drop bombs. Beneath the image, the copy
read, “If an enemy attacked right now would you know what to do?” The ad contained
information about the CONELRAD alert system that would broadcast information in case
of attack. In a complete reversal o f earlier goals, the ad does not call for any kind of
volunteerism in civil defense activities. It simply encouraged readers to write for the
civil defense booklet. Six Steps to Survival

Advertising Council, CONELRAD, Record Series 13/02/207, File #744, Advertising Council
Archives, University o f Illinois Archives.
Ibid.
Ibid. Interestingly, requests were not made to any administrator or office in particular; rather
they were to be addressed simply to “Survival.”
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If an enemy attacked right now
would you know what to do?
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Figure 8- Advertising Councii, CONELRAD, 1955.

This advertisement and others in the kit used images o f family to appeal to the
emotions o f Americans. This ad contained a disconnect between the image and the text.
The imagery offered a frightening proposition: that Soviet attack could come at any time,
anywhere. The text however offered a surprisingly calm command to remember to tune
into the radio. It says, “There’s just one thing to remember— and it could save your life
and the lives of your family. It is this: GO TO YOUR RADIO and tune in 640 or
I24 o_”104

Advertising Council, Civil Defense Volunteer Recruiting Kit, Federal Civil Defense
Administration,” Record Series 13/02/207, File #576, Advertising Council Archives, University o f Illinois
Archives.
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The content o f the CONELRAD kit illustrates the trajectory in the relationship
between the FCDA and the Ad Council. The move from the Volunteer Recruitment Kit,
to First Aid, and eventually to the CONELRAD campaign all represented the FCDA’s
concessions to the Ad Council’s favored type o f ads. The FCDA finally recognized the
value o f ads that urged simple actions. It also marked the last campaign undertaken
explicitly for the cause o f civil defense by the Ad Council. In 1960, civil defense
officials, then housed in the Office o f Civil Defense and Management, asked the
Advertising Council to create a campaign about the need for fallout shelters. The
Council rejected the campaign because it would be an impossible sell, that it “would be
an immensely difficult job even in the case o f a shooting war. Lacking such an obvious
danger, it would be necessary for the highest officials o f government to warn solemnly
and repeatedly that this must be done.”' ”^ While fallout shelters briefly became an
important element o f the civil defense program under the Kennedy Administration, the
Advertising Council failed to show any interest in the promotion o f the new shelter
policy.
Tensions between the FCDA and the Ad Council soured their relationship
throughout the 1950s. The two groups consistently had different ideas about the best
method to promote survival. Even after the Eisenhower administration took office and
the personal tensions abated somewhat, Ad Council executives did not hesitate to let their
feelings be known about the FCDA’s policies. One such incident took place in 1956,
when Ad Council executives expressed outrage over the FCDA’s new booklet and radio

Theodore Repplier to James M. Lambie, Aug. 15, 1960; Lambie Records; Box 56, Office o f
Civil and Defense Mobilization 1960, DDEL.
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spot for “Four Wheels to Survival.” ' ”” The spot and booklet claimed that the personal
automobile could provide shelter in case o f an attack and could also be used for
evacuation and then as a living space.'”’ The Advertising Council’s outrage over the
pamphlet demonstrates how far apart the FCDA and the Ad Council diverged on the
policy o f civil defense. Not only did the Ad Council believe that they knew how to sell
civil defense most effectively, but they also opposed FCDA policy. This incident
illustrates the rejection o f the optimism o f the FCDA by the Ad Council, a rejection that
made their relationship nearly impossible. Although personality conflicts led to some of
the tension between the Ad Council and the FCDA, the Ad Council’s reluctance to take
on the campaigns requested by the FCDA reflected more their knowledge and insight into
the American public as advertisers than any vendetta against the FCDA. The Ad
Council’s position accurately reflected the dominant culture o f the time and the apathy of
not only the American public, but also the executive branch toward civil defense.
Without overwhelming support o f public officials, it seems nearly impossible that civil
defense could ever reach the level o f prestige that its leaders imagined and hoped for the
policy.
As short-lived and tense as the relationship between the FCDA and the Ad
Council was, it allowed for an institutionalization o f civil defense in the marketplace. It
set up and encouraged many o f the relationships that would continue throughout the
1950s between private companies and local civil defense agencies. The public service
campaigns created by the Advertising Council used nuclear, white, suburban families to

Notes between James Lambie and Harold Rosenberg, October 18, 1956; Lambie Records; Box
27, Civil Defense Administration, Federal - Correspondence 1956, DDEL.
™ McEnaney, 55.
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represent America, effectively eliminating class and ethnic differences. The narrow
image o f America as conceptualized by the Advertising Council helps show one way that
the consensus o f the early Cold War was deliberately structured and carefully maintained.
These public service campaigns illustrate how the federal government, through the power
o f advertising, helped frame the national debate about preparedness.
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CHAPTER 4

THE SHOW YOU’LL NEVER FORGET:
THE ALERT AMERICA CONVOY
In 1952, three ten-truck convoys carried the Alert America exhibit to cities across
United States with the mission of inspiring interest in civil defense. US Senator Margaret
Chase Smith authored an editorial in January of that year urging readers to visit the
convoy when it visited their towns. Smith decried the fact that the American people and
congress had to be sold “a bill of goods on civilian defense” and compared the exhibit to
an advertising campaign writing, the “Alert America convoys are basically nothing more
than educational advertising and an attempt to do a selling job to the American
people.” ' ”^ Smith’s editorial neatly summed up the imagined role for the convoy, that it
would travel the country visiting targeted cities and encourage people to volunteer for the
civil defense agency in their hometowns and increase the prominence o f the Federal Civil
Defense Administration in the eyes o f Congress. While the mission o f the Alert America
campaign was straightforward, the design and content o f the exhibit strove to brand civil
defense as a fundamental component o f the American way o f life.
The Alert America Convoy followed in the tracks o f the Freedom Train, an
exhibit that traveled across the United States after World War II. A number o f groups
came together to create and sponsor the train, including civic groups, advertisers, mass

Margaret Chase Smith, “Alert America,” Oakland Tribune, January 24, 1952, D48.
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media, and the federal government. The Freedom Train encouraged Americans to
rededicate themselves to their country and carried in it various historical documents
including the Bill o f Rights, Constitution, Declaration o f Independence, Emancipation
Proclamation, and artifacts from World War II including the Iwo Jima flag and surrender
documents from Japan and Germany. The train served as the forerunner for the Alert
America exhibit and as a “model for those who sought to elevate American patriotism
and Cold War consciousness.”' ””
Edward Burdick, the designer behind the 1939 New York’s World Fair and the
Freedom Train, designed the Alert America exhibit."” The Federal Civil Defense
Administration sponsored the exhibit, while donations largely financed its construction
and operation. Kenneth Wells o f the non-profit Freedoms Foundation oversaw the free
exhibit. Crisscrossing the nation, the exhibit distributed information on how to prepare
for an atomic attack and peaceable uses o f atomic energy. Wells hoped that the Alert
America campaign would emphasize that civil defense was an important part of “the free
American way o f life based as it is on a fundamental belief in God, on constitutional
government designed to serve the people, and our indivisible bundle o f political and
economic rights.” " ' The Alert America exhibit offered an image o f civil defense aligned
with Cold W ar patriotism while asserting that atomic weapons could be managed and
beat by modest preparation.
Richard M. Fried, The Russians are coming! The Russians are Coming! Pageantry and
Patriotism in Cold-War America (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), 28. Fried’s discussion o f the
planning o f the Freedom Train exhibit and the debates that surrounded the selection o f artifacts for display
shows just how contested meanings o f what it meant to be an American in the years immediately following
World War 11 were.
™ New York Times, January 19, 1952, 5.
Kenneth D. Wells, “The Alert America Convoys: Campaign Book.” Kenneth D. Wells
Collection; 20* and 2U' Century Western and Mormon Americana; L. Tom Perry Special Collections,
Harold B. Lee Library, Brigham Young University, MSS 1503, Box 3, Folder 2, Book 3. p.3.
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The FCDA adopted “Alert America” as the slogan for their public information
campaign in 1951 with the goal o f informing “the American people o f their grave danger
and the need for Civil Defense for protection.”"^ Two goals guided the public education
campaign: first, to inform Americans about the fundamentals o f self-protection and
second, to enlist Americans as volunteers for civil defense."^ The FCDA conceived of
two major components o f the public education campaign, both relying on the cooperation
of private industry for their implementation: the Advertising Council’s development of
public information campaigns and the Alert America convoy.

The Alert America

convoy aimed to “give a living, visible, dramatic action to the urgent but intangible
concept o f civil defense.”" ” According to official materials, the Alert America exhibit
aimed to convince Americans o f the reality o f the Soviet threat and that “civil defense is
every citizen’s duty.” '

It also had the ambitious goal o f enlisting fifteen million

volunteers for civil defense."’ The Alert America exhibit functioned as one part of
massive public information campaign by the FCDA that included advertising campaigns,
movies, television and radio spots, and various publications. More so than the other
components. Alert America explicitly linked civil defense with the Cold W ar conception
o f American patriotism.
In 1951, the FCDA asked the Freedoms Foundation at Valley Forge to take on the
task o f developing a traveling exhibit to stimulate interest in civil defense. The Freedoms
112

Alert America campaign, Progress Report. WHCF; OF, File 1591C, Alert America, HSTL.
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“The What and How o f the Alert America Campaign,” LTPSC, BYU, MSS 1503, Box 3, Fid I.

“The Civil Defense Alert America Convoy: The Show that may save your life,” WHCF: OF,
File 2965, Federal Civil Defense Administration, 1952-53, HSTL.
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Foundations, founded in 1949 by General Eisenhower, Kenneth Wells, and other
prominent politicians and business leaders, aimed to enhance and protect the “American
way of life.”"* The Freedoms Foundation advocated for conservative economic policies
and embarked on campaigns to educate Americans about the Constitution and free
enterprise system ."” The Freedoms Foundation created a separate entity, the Valley
Forge Foundation, to design and build the massive exhibit. Kenneth Wells, then
president of the Freedoms Foundation, took the head role in the Valley Forge
Foundation.'^”
The patriotic conservatism o f the Freedoms Foundation colored the design and
content o f the exhibit. Kenneth Wells, in his position as head o f the Valley Forge
Foundation, sought to imbue the exhibit with piety and patriotism.'^' His statements
about the convoy positioned civil defense as a crucial component o f the American way of
life by conflating anti-communism and preparedness. Wells identified a clear enemy to
the American way o f life that constantly guided his thoughts about the Alert America
convoy, he wrote that The Enemy (his emphasis) seeks to destroy all “we hold dearest in
life, our freedoms, our ideals, our moral standards, our spiritual v a l u e s . T h e FCDA’s
partnership with the Freedoms Foundation unequivocally linked civil defense with larger

Richard M. Fried, The Russians are coming! The Russians are Coming! Pageantry and
Patriotism in Cold-War America (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), 21.
"'Ibid.
Fried, 46.
The Truman Administration remained frigid to Wells’ despite his involvement with the Alert
America campaign. He sent a copy o f a souvenir book from the Alert America exhibit to the White House
for the president’s signature it was returned unsigned because Wells was an “eager beaver” and “General’s
Boy.” HST, Cross-reference Sheet, December 6, 1952; WHCF: OF, File 1591C, Alert America.
Kenneth D. Wells, “The Alert America Convoys: Campaign Book.” LTPSC, BYU, MSS 1503,
Box 3, Folder 2, Book 3. p. 7.
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conservative political trends o f the early 1950s such as anti-communism, practicing of
religion, and a belief in the benefits o f free enterprise.
While the Alert America exhibit primarily focused on the need for civil defense, it
also featured a section on the peaceful uses o f atomic energy. This juxtaposition at first
seems a contradiction, but points to the dual role o f the atom in the early years o f the
Cold War. While the atomic bomb launched an age of uncertainty and possible total
destruction, it also heralded in the “Atomic Age,” a period o f rapid technological
advances and seemingly endless possibilities. Alert America was by far the largest
example o f the way in which the propaganda about the peaceful possibilities o f atomic
energy collided with warnings about the destructive power o f atomic weaponry, but not
the first o f such exhibits. In 1950 and 1951, fairs and exhibitions across the United States
included atomic energy displays. Oak Ridge Institute o f Nuclear Studies offered up
exhibits on atomic energy to state fairs. The exhibits demonstrated the splitting of
uranium atoms, a cartoon on atomic energy, samples o f radioactive plants, and an
“exhibit o f radioactive frogs in a Lucite-enclosed pool” with a Geiger counter of the pool
so spectators could identify the radioactive f r o g s . T h e Oak Ridge exhibit was
displayed at the Long Beach Exposition in California surrounded by circus acts, a home
show, and the other expected components o f a fair. The Oak Ridge exhibit, in addition to
detailing the wonders o f atomic energy, offered a “thrilling demonstration” on “how a
family escapes under atomic attack.” '^"' Another example o f this type o f exhibit was
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‘Institute Will Show Nuclear Phenomena at State Fairs,” Los Angeles Times, August I, 1950,
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Los Angeles Times, July 20, 1951, 13. The advertisement for the show is quite visually
striking. The background is taken up by a mushroom cloud with a box in front o f it with two clowns touts
the “star-studded circus and exposition.”
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Westinghouse’s “The Theatre o f the Atom” built for the Chicago Fair in 1950. It
included “a three-dimensional atom model, a miniature atom-smasher, an electrostatic
‘atomic’ motor, a ‘mousetrap’ bomb, and other exhibits to explain atomic energy.'^”
New York City hosted an atomic energy show in 1951, billed as the “most complete
demonstration o f atomic energy ever assembled.”'^” The exhibit focused on the
peacetime uses o f atomic energy but also offered “instructions on individual defense
against atom b o m b s . E x h i b i t s celebrating the wonders o f the atom were designed to
satisfy people’s curiosity about atomic energy.'^* These exhibits focused on the wonders
of the Atomic Age and the possibility o f atomic energy to transform completely the
American way o f life. The novelty surrounding the atom during the first part of the
decade contributed to difficulties in communicating the real dangers posed by atomic war
and led to tension between the celebratory tone o f exhibits on atomic energy and the
much more serious exhibits on the need for civil defense.
Just as the FCDA recognized that civil defense as policy needed to be sold, the
Valley Forge foundation saw a need for promotion before the convoy arrived to “arouse
the greatest possible interest in it.”

Wells urged people to “capitalize on the “Alert

“Plans Model Atom Show,” New York Times, June 4, 1950, F8; “Fair to Show How Atomic
Forces Work,” Chicago Tribune, April 18, 1950, 1.
“Atom Energy Shows Opens Here Today,” New York Times, May 14, 1951,

16.

Ibid.
At the Chicago Fair, visitors to the Westinghouse exhibit were given cards to fill out for a
drawing for a set o f Encyclopedia Britannica. The winning card was the one that was radioactive when
placed under a Geiger counter. “Radioactive Card to Reveal Winner at Fair,” Chicago Tribune, July 4,
1950, A4.
Kenneth D. Wells, “The Alert America Campaign For Your Community.” LTPSC, BYU MSS
1503, Box 3, Folder 1, p.5 The draft o f this statement said that the exhibit, like the circus was coming to
town. Apparently, the comparison to a circus was found to be in poor choice and was not included in the
final statement.
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America” Convoy visit to get your hometown prepared for the real thing.” ' ”” He wrote
several objectives for advertising including participation and awareness o f civil defense,
but also to persuade Americans that “a strong Civil Defense is necessary to protect our
Freedoms and build an enduring Peace.” ' ”' The content o f the advertisements and the
records o f the Valley Forge Foundation show the very real ways that the exhibit was
meant to link civil defense with freedom, religion, and anti-communism. The
Advertising Council assisted in the effort, but focused primarily on getting people to the
exhibit and ignored larger statements about the meaning o f civil defense. They created a
packet of ads to be used before and during the exhibit’s visit to a town. The ads marketed
the exhibit as a “Show you’ll never forget” and advertisements appeared primarily on
movie pages in local papers.'”^ Nearly all of the marketing alluded to the awesome
power o f the show. A number o f articles and ads stressed the importance o f the exhibit
and that at least one member of each household should visit it.'”” The promotion o f the
Alert America exhibit, both by the Valley Forge Foundation and by the Advertising
Council, focused on the importance o f the show in preparing Americans for an atomic
attack.
Advertisements for the Alert America convoy worked to attract visitors to the
exhibit. At the request o f the FCDA, the Advertising Council created a national
campaign for the convoy. These advertisements addressed both the atomic energy and
civil defense components of the exhibit. These ads illustrate the tension between
Kenneth D. Wells, “The What and How o f the ‘Alert America’ Campaign.” LTPSC, BYU
MSS 1503, Box 3, Folder 1, p. 5.
Kenneth D. Wells, “The Alert America Convoys; Campaign Book.” LTPSC, BYU MSS 1503,
Box 3, Folder 2, Book 3, p. 70.
One such example is in Los Angeles Times, May 20, 1952, B7.
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celebrating the possibilities o f atomic energy and the serious need for civil defense. In
one, the largest graphic on the page was a mushroom cloud. Next to the cloud, four
smaller images detailed the features o f the exhibit. It said the exhibit would show both
the “remarkable uses of atomic energy” and a “vivid dramatization o f an actual A-bomb
attack.” ' ”"' The ad claimed that the Alert America exhibit would show “the ‘inside story’
o f modem war weapons— and how organized Civil Defense can beat this menace.”' ”” An
important theme in the Ad Council’s campaign was the use o f Paul Revere on horseback
as the symbol of Alert America. These ads recalled Paul Revere s ride to warn colonists
of the British invasion. The imagery o f Paul Revere connected Cold War civil defense
with the American Revolution, aligning the Alert America’s message of survival through
preparedness with Paul Revere’s early warning and eventual victory by the colonists in
the Revolutionary War. Promotional materials for Alert America all carried several
secondary messages; that a visit to the exhibit was a duty o f every household, that civil
defense could protect Americans from atomic attack, and a balancing o f the threat o f
possible atomic war with the possibilities o f atomic energy. Notably absent from the
materials produced by the Advertising Council were mentions o f the “the Enemy” and an
emphasis on moral and religious fortitude that infiltrated the promotional material o f the
Valley Forge foundation. This absence points to differences in ideology between the
Valley Forge Foundation, the Ad Council, and the FCDA.

Advertising Council, Alert America Convoy, 1952, Record Series 13/02/207, File #597,
Advertising Council Archives, University o f Illinois Archives.
Ibid.
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Figure 9- Alert America poster, Advertising Council

The Valley Forge Foundation created its own promotional materials for the
convoy. Wells asserted that the convoy offered “real merchandising and promotional
opportunities” to stores since “practically every department o f a store and every type of
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store has some type of merchandise that fulfills some requirement of Civil Defense.”' ””
Department stores set up shop windows that featured preparedness products and also
included information on the visit o f the convoy. Materials sent ahead o f the visit by the
Valley Forge Foundation listed a number o f possible promotions for host communities
such as including civil defense inserts in company mailings, donated space on restaurant
menus, changing street names for the week, and other imaginative endorsements o f the
Alert America convoy.'”’ These creative marketing efforts helped establish a crucial link
between preparedness education and the promotion of goods and services that is
examined in the next chapter. Stores and businesses took part in the promotional
activities because it allowed them to generate positive feelings in their customers who
then saw the businesses as providing a valuable public service. This symbiotic
relationship became even more pronounced throughout the 1950s, as businesses
published educational material for patrons and employees. The Valley Forge Foundation
also suggested more traditional promotional activities for the exhibit and sent ahead
sample speeches, radio spots, and editorials to cities hosting the exhibit.'”* Materials
created by the Valley Forge Foundation emphasized the role o f civil defense in protecting
the American way of life. The types o f promotions as wells the organizers’ statements
connected the civil defense effort with consumption, religion, and morality.

Kenneth D. Wells, “The Alert America Convoys: Campaign Book.” LTPSC, BYU MSS 1503,
Box 3, Folder 2, Book 3, p. 76.
Kenneth D. Wells, “The Alert America Convoys: Campaign Book.” LTPSC, BYU MSS 1503,
Box 3, Folder 2, Book 3, p. 90.
Kenneth D. Wells, “Alert America.” LTPSC, BYU MSS 1503, Box 3, Folder 3.
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Designed to “drive home the reality and nature o f the threat that faces us,” the
Alert America exhibit attempted to motivate visitors to volunteer for civil defense.'””
The convoy was divided into two segments with the first h alf showing the possible
enemy attacks on the United States and the second half detailing what individuals could
do “to meet this threat.” '"'” The layout o f the exhibit emphasized that civil defense was a
responsibility o f every American in the Atomic Age. The early parts o f the exhibit
focused on the real threats that faced the United States and used sound, fire, and hissing
gas to show visitors the face o f the enemy as foreboding communist menace. The next
section contained footage of an atomic blast and a mock attack on an American city. The
exhibit climaxed with the possible destruction o f an atomic bomb. The exhibit ended
with a focus on hope, with an “inspiring exhibit on the heritage o f freedom that is
America’s and which we guard though Civil Defense.”'"" This last area summarized the
need for civil defense and exhorted visitors to, “Love your freedoms, live your freedoms,
guard your freedoms.” The last room contained pictures o f iconic American symbols
including the Liberty Bell. A child praying was the last visual for exiting visitors.'"'^ In
no uncertain terms. Alert America connected civil defense with what it maintained made
a good American: religious and patriotic.

Kenneth D. Wells, “The Alert America Convoys: Campaign Book.” LTPSC, BYU MSS 1503,
Box 3, Folder 2, Book 3, p. 11.
Ibid.
What You Will See in the Civil Defense, Alert America Exhibit, Quick Files; Box 6, Civil
Defense Campaign- General (1), HSTL.
“ "Ibid.
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Figure 10- What You Will See in the Civil Defense, A lert Am erica Exhibit

The design o f the Alert America exhibit consciously attempted to convert visitors
into volunteers by employing graphic illustrations o f the destruction o f the atomic bomb
paired with symbolic images o f America’s past. As visitors left the exhibit, they were
encouraged to sign a personal pledge to volunteer for civil defense in their community,
but few visitors signed pledge cards. Over one million people visited the convoy in 80
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different cities, but only six percent signed pledge cards.'"'” Despite the small number of
volunteer commitments, organizers considered the exhibit a success, calling the public
education results gratifying.'"'"' Based on the number o f visitors compared to the number
of volunteers, the Convoy seemed to fail in its mission to convince Americans o f their
critical role in civil defense efforts. While it may not have inspired most visitors to
volunteer. Alert America did effectively connect civil defense with notions o f what it
meant to be a good American.
By creating an interactive exhibit that graphically illustrated the potential
devastation o f an atomic attack while simultaneously promoting peaceful uses o f atomic
energy. Alert America captures many o f the tensions inherent in the official civil defense
rhetoric o f the 1950s. The promotion o f the show also demonstrated the ways
Advertising Council commimicated assumptions both about civil defense and, more
importantly, American families and their homes. Alert America, with its overt emphasis
on patriotism, illustrates one o f the ways civil defense was constructed as an important
civic duty. It shows how officials attempted to reconcile the destructive power o f the
atomic bomb with the incredible possibilities o f the atom.

Kenneth D. Wells, “Valley Forge Foundation Report on Alert Ameriea Convoys,” February 10,
1953; LTPSC, BYU MSS 1503, Box 3, Folder 1, p.l7. (The official report listed 1,096,102 visitors in 80
eities, with 67,171 signing pledge eards; it did not inelude a percentage).
Kenneth D. Wells, “Valley Forge Foundation Report on Alert Ameriea Convoys.” February
10, 1953; LTPSC, BYU MSS 1503, Box 3, Folder 1, p. 14.
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CHAPTER 5

DUMMY DOOMTOWN IN THE DESERT:
CIVIL DEFENSE TESTS AT THE NEVADA TEST SITE
Throughout the 1950s, civil defense officials participated in nuclear weapons tests
at the Nevada Test Site (NTS). During two testing programs, Operation Doorstep in
1953 and Operation Cue in 1955, the FCDA tested the effect o f bombs on mock cities
filled with the latest consumer goods, including cars, clothing, and frozen foods. The
public received information about the tests in official reports and films from the FCDA
and through widespread print and television coverage. The FCDA used the test programs
to convince Americans o f the importance o f civil defense and assure them that through
modest preparation they could survive an atomic attack. This message was imperative to
the aims o f the FCDA; civil defense could only be successful if Americans believed that
an atomic weapon could be survived.
The testing o f civil defense measures at the NTS tried to reconcile the use of
unrealistically small bombs that came nowhere near the destructive power o f the USSR’s
weapons with the certain total destruction that would come from the use o f a bomb o f that
magnitude would lead to conclusions that survival was impossible. The FCDA and the
AEC decided to use smaller atomic bombs rather than testing the full destructive power
of the hydrogen bomb. This decision limited the applicability o f data collected. Private
industry also took part in the test programs through the donation o f goods to be tested in
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the blasts. Examining the various forces that went into the civil defense tests as well
accounts o f the tests in official reports and the popular press reveals the ways that these
civil defense exercises continued to frame preparedness as an issue for individual
American families.
The federal government established the Nevada Test Site in 1950, as increased
hostilities in Korea heightened Cold War tensions, made the need for a continental testing
site apparent.'"*” The federal government chose a site in southern Nevada, part o f the
United States Air Force’s Las Vegas Bombing and Gunnery Range.'"*” Officials
identified several benefits o f the site, including a small population o f people nearby and
an abundance o f federally owned land and resources within close proximity.'"*’ On
December 18, 1950, President Truman approved the development o f the Nevada Proving
Ground, later renamed the Nevada Test Site.'"** Nevada residents were notified about the
site through a press release issued by the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) in January
1951.'"*” Las Vegas newspapers focused on the positive economic aspects o f the
construction o f the testing site, the added tourist draw, and rejected the possibility o f
health problems as the result o f tests only 65 miles aw ay.'”” On January 27, 1951, the
AEC detonated the first atomic bomb at the Nevada Proving G round.'”'

Origins o f the Nevada Test Site (Department o f Energy, 2000), 43.
Ibid., 44.
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A. Costandina Titus, Bombs in the Backyard: Atomic Testing and American Politics (Reno:
University o f Nevada Press, 1986), 56.
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Ibid., 55, 58.
Ibid., 70.
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Collaboration between the FCDA and the Atomic Energy Commission began in
1951 during the Buster-Jangle test series.'”” The FCDA tested twenty-eight home
shelters and used the information collected to prepare guides for homeowners about the
most effective in case of an attack.'”” The 1951 test operation failed to gamer much
attention nationally, because officials did not promote it widely and did not release
footage from the actual test. Buster-Jangle set the precedent for future joint operations
between the FCDA and the AEC.
Two years later, FCDA officials again visited the NTS to participate in an atomic
bomb test operation, Upshot-Knothole. This time, the FCDA created a series of media
opportunities to promote the civil defense program. The FCDA referred to their activities
as Operation Doorstep. In it, FCDA officials recreated two typical American homes and
tested the effect of an atomic bomb on the houses, shelters, automobiles, clothing, and
food. ' ”"* The FCDA flooded the media with images o f the test operation. This test
marked the first time civil defense observers were allowed to wimess the detonation of an
atomic bom b.'”” Millard Caldwell, head of the Federal Civil Defense Administration,
allowed the observation because he felt “it will stimulate the zeal and raise the
effectiveness o f civil defense volunteers and paid personnel.” ' ”” The FCDA partnered
with other federal agencies during the test, including the AEC, the Department of
Defense, and the Department o f Agriculture. Private companies lent support by

Robert L. Corsbie, Operation Plumb-Bob: Shelters and Associated Tests: A Preliminary Report
o f a Continuing Program (Washington: GPO, 1957), 2.
Ibid.
Federal Civil Defense Administration, 1953 Annual Report, (Washington: GPO, 1954), 59.
HST, Cross Reference Sheet, March 13, 1952; WHCF: Confidential File; Box 63, FCDA,
HSTL.
Ibid.

67

providing the materials to be tested including clothing, food, furniture, and
automobiles.’^’
In Operation Doorstep, civil defense officials examined the effects o f an atomic
blast on typical American homes. The FCDA constructed a miniature town
affectionately referred to as “Doom Town,” complete with houses and automobiles. The
population consisted o f mannequins donated by the L.A. Darling Company and outfitted
by the local J.C. Penney s t o r e . O f f i c i a l reports focused on two houses o f “typical
American construction” inhabited by mannequins in everyday poses such as sitting at a
table and sitting in the living room.’^^ The Advertising Council sponsored the broadcast
o f the test on national television to increase attention o f three o f their campaigns; civil
defense, blood drives, and the Ground Observer C o r p s . F o l l o w i n g the blast, accounts
referred to the destruction of the “Doom Town” and the mannequins as stand-ins for a
typical American town and average citizens.
Operation Doorstep continued the FCDA’s use o f cooperative promotion efforts.
Various companies lent support to the test program and in return received praise from the
FCDA and mentions in press accounts and reports following the test. This program of
cooperative promotion defined much o f the FCDA’s efforts during the Cold War. The
FCDA especially appreciated the support o f the automobile industry and praised them in
their 1953 Annual Report saying, “the most important technical test involving
participation by private industry dealt with the effect o f atomic explosions on automotive
Federal Civil Defense Administration, 1953 Annual Report, (Washington: GPO, 1954), 59.
http://www.nv.doe.gov/news&pubs/publications/historyreports/news&views/perspective.htm
Last accessed March 14, 2006; Federal Civil Defense Administration, 1953 Annual Report, (Washington:
GPO, 1954), 59.
Federal Civil Defense Administration, 1953 Annual Report, (Washington: GPO, 1954), 60.
Advertising Council, Annual Report, 1952-53, (New York: Advertising Council, 1953), 6.
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vehicles and their occupants.”’®' Such participation did not go without benefit to the
donating dealerships. Automobile dealerships in southern California exhibited “atombombed” cars following the b l a s t . M a n n e q u i n s used in the two houses went on display
in store windows for display and exhibition for the public.’®^ Other companies used the
tests as an opportunity to secure unofficial endorsements and talk about the ability of
their product to withstand an atomic attack and then assert that the product could
certainly withstand everyday wear and tear.’®"* Such relationships were quite important to
the FCDA. The Administration, due in part to their small budget, relied on others to
disseminate information about civil defense. Neither did the Administration have the
funds to secure the items needed to stock “Doom Town.” These relationships further
helped the FCDA spread the message o f preparedness in the marketplace, and helped
cement the bond between citizenship and consumption.
Press coverage following Operation Doorstep points to conflicting feelings about
the test program. Some articles certainly reflected the FCDA’s exuberant attitude toward
the program, but others revealed ongoing debates about the utility o f civil defense and
pointed out lags in the national program. Some authors questioned the prudence o f airing
the test on national TV, claiming that because many of the mannequins emerged
relatively unharmed, interest in civil defense would be “paralyzed.” ’®®A number of
accounts o f the test focused on the image o f the mushroom cloud and the usefulness o f
Federal Civil Defense Administration, 1953 Annual Report, (Washington: GPO, 1954), 59.
Los Angeles Times, May 23, 1953, 11.
“Atomic ‘Victims’ Going on Y iew ” Los Angeles Times, March 30, 1953, 6. “The Wax Models
Will be Taken on Tour,” Z«5 Vegas Sun, April 3, 1953.
Beautyrest mattress after test in 1955, Hotel Monthly Magazine, Simmons Company Records,
Collection #731, Archives Center, National Museum o f American History.
165 “Television in Review: Yucca Flats Reflects Danger o f Overstressing Atom Destruction at Cost
to Civil Defense,” New York Times, March 18, 1953.
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the test in stimulating interest in civil defense. One example, “A-Bomb’s Grim
Reminders o f Lagging Civil Defense,” was published in the Philadelphia Inquirer. The
author claimed that images from the test were in fact the best motivators for civil defense,
writing, “Better than reams o f words these pictures pointed up the personal significance
of the perils of Atomic Age.” ’®® While many articles offered fairly straightforward
summaries o f the test program, an article in Parade Magazine summed up many o f the
conflicting feelings about the test program. In the article, a 21 year-old Las Vegas
housewife recounted her feelings at the detonation. She wrote, “If you had seen what I
saw, you’d realize how important civil defense is. All my life. I ’ll remember that atomic
cloud drifting in the wind after the blast. It looked like a stairway to Hell.”’®’ She
pointed toward civil defense as an important duty, but failed to acknowledge the
possibility o f survival and instead ended on the note that the mushroom cloud looked like
a stairway to Hell. Taken together these articles illustrate the complicated range of
reactions to Operation Doorstep.
In their 1953 Annual Report, the FCDA listed the benefits o f the test program.
They asserted that the real value o f Operation Doorstep did not lay in the collection o f
data on the effect of the bomb on homes and furnishings, but that press coverage o f the
blast “did more to stimulate interest and promote knowledge o f self-protection and civil
defense than any other event during the past year.” ’®* This statement explicitly reveals
the real intent o f the FCDA in Operation Doorstep and asserts that the test program was
little more than a massive publicity stimt. The FCDA released an official film and book
166

“^.B om b’s Grim Reminder o f Lagging Civil Defense,” Philadelphia Inquirer, March 22,

1953.
“I Saw a Stairway to Hell,” Parade, April 26, 1953, 6-7.
Federal Civil Defense Administration, 1953 Annual Report, (Washington: GPO, 1954), 60.
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commemorating the exercise. The official film, produced by a private company,
emphasized that “simple, inexpensive shelters in the basement or backyard might mean
the difference between life and death o f this country should it be attacked.” '®^ The film,
marketed toward civic organizations, schools, and civil defense organizations, retailed for
$27, including shipping, from the company that produced it.” ®
The official book. Operation Doorstep, was published by the FCDA and made
available for free to the public. The book summarized the objective o f the test program
as “to show the people o f America what might be expected if an atomic burst took place
over the doorsteps o f our major cities.” ” ’ The book continued the goal o f showing
Americans’ how a typical town would fare after a blast by including a number o f images
of the mannequins in before and after shots o f the houses. The text admonished readers
to outwit the mannequins and prepare and survive an atomic blast. The FCDA compared
the mannequins to typical suburban American families throughout Operation Doorstep.
Despite the optimistic tone o f the book that promised readers survival through
preparation, questions remained about the applicability o f evidence from the test. Time
magazine summarized these doubts in a scathing review o f the book and called the actual
test results “less reassuring” than the book reported.” ^ The Time review foreshadowed
the general reaction to later testing programs.

Federal Civil Defense Administration, “Press Information no. 340,” June 28, 1953; Lambie
Records; Box 3, Civil Defense - General 1953 (2).
Federal Civil Defense Administration, “Press Information no. 340,” June 28, 1953; Lambie
Records; Box 3, Civil Defense - General 1953 (2). This model, with private enterprise producing and
distributing films related to civil defense, with the cooperation o f the FCDA, continued throughout the
1950s. FCDA, “For Your Information;” July 22, 1954.
Federal Civil Defense Administration, Operation Doorstep (Washington: GPO, 1953), 2.
“Operation Doorway,” Time, July 6, 1953.
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Figure 11- Image of a mannequin from Operation Doorstep
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Footage from Operation Doorstep found use in later public service films. One
example o f this type aired on television during National Fire Prevention Week. The film,
The House in the Middle, compared the fates o f three-miniature houses that were part o f
the Operation Doorstep testing program. The film asserted that the middle house fared
the blast the best “because it is free o f litter and trash, properly painted, and made o f good
materials. The other two are completely destroyed by fire as a result o f their rundown,
badly weathered condition and trash accumulations around one o f them.” ” ^ The film,
while sponsored by the FCDA, paid little attention to civil defense and used the backdrop
o f the atomic bomb to convince viewers o f the need for fire prevention. According to the
film, houses with trash and weathered paint were not only eyesores, but “may be doomed
in the Atomic Age.” The houses with rotten wood, dried grass, and messes inside quickly
burned, while the only damage the house in the middle sustained was some charring o f its
exterior paint. The film connected cleanliness with good American ideals and stated that
cleanliness could guarantee survival. The explicit connections the film made between
good housekeeping and survival points to the ways that civil defense rhetoric moved far
beyond actual theories about survival to become a hallmark o f what it meant to be a good
American; that good citizenship was something that could be purchased and displayed
outwardly, in this case through a clean and nicely painted hom e.” "*
Administrators at the FCDA viewed Operation Doorstep as a success because it
dramatically increased the amount o f attention paid to national civil defense efforts.
However, despite the best hopes o f Administrator Caldwell, it did not lead to an increase
Federal Civil Defense Administration, “For Your Information, Public Affairs # 8 1 ,” Sept. 28,
1953.
The House in the Middle, National Paint, Varnish and Lacquer Association, 1954. Film
footage is part o f the Prelinger Archive and is available at www.archive.org.
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in the number o f volunteers for civil defense and the FCDA’s budget continued to shrink.
Based on the success o f the test in generating attention for civil defense, the FCDA set
the plans in motion for an even larger test at the Nevada Test Site in 1955.
The FCDA hoped the 1955 test would serve to reinvigorate lagging interest in
civil defense. FCDA officials converged on the Nevada Test Site during the Apple 2 test
and labeled their program Operation Cue. It “was brought into the homes o f America by
every medium o f communication,” just like Operation Doorstep was two years earlier.” ®
Just as before, it served as an opportunity for self-promotion on the part o f the companies
involved in the testing program.
While planners conceived o f Operation Cue as a bulked-up version o f Operation
Doorstep, the reaction to the second test was much more negative. During the two years
between the tests, the national attitude toward atomic weapons grew increasing hostile
and the press accounts contained much more cynicism than those on Operation Doorstep
had. The press reported with skepticism about the usefulness o f the information gathered
since the FCDA used a bomb o f significantly less power than those currently held by the
Soviet Union. A series o f weather-related delays further soured the media’s feelings
toward the FCDA as the press and civil defense visitors became frustrated at the
postponements. Visitors to the test operation faced problems finding hotel rooms in the
city during the delays.” ® The FCDA did their best to play good host to the visitors and
planned day trips to Hoover Dam and Death Valley during the delays.” ’ The test

Federal Civil Defense Administration, 1955 Annual Report, (Washington: GPO, 1956), 71.
Press Release, The Sands, April 28,1955; Lambie Records; Box 19, CUE, Operation (the
atomic test program - Federal Civil Defense Adm.) 1955, DDEL.
Revised Schedule, Operation Cue, Atomic Test Operations Open Shot Program, April 22-27,
1955; Lambie Records; Box 19, CUE, Operation (the atomic test program - Federal Civil Defense Adm.)
1955, DDEL.
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eventually took place on May 3, 1955, several weeks after originally scheduled.” *
Nearly all newspaper accounts reported negatively on Operation Doorstep. The Salt Lake
Tribune’s account of Operation Doorstep encapsulated the tone o f most reports on the
test. The headline read, “Atom Show Fizzles Despite Top Billing” and it went on to
compare the test to a circus and claimed it “turned into the biggest flop in show business
history.” The author continued, “Billed as a ‘spectacular’ that would galvanize the
nation’s prodigious civil defense effort, the atomic tests serious purpose has been lost in a
bally-hoo hoopla, with press agents stepping on each other’s toes, observers agreed.”” ^
Operation Cue failed to generate the positive press for civil defense that Operation
Doorstep had just two years earlier. The FCDA failed to take into account changes in the
public’s feelings toward continental testing and increased apathy toward civil defense.
The larger scale o f Operation Cue made observers even more aware that the program was
little more than a media stunt and the press largely rejected the spectacle.
Three major components made up the Operation Cue program. The observer
program, the first component, focused on the observation o f the detonation by civil
defense officials.” ® Volunteer civil defense workers participated in the field exercise
program, the second component in which they practiced responding to an emergency.
Civil effects tests made up the final component o f the Cue program. In these tests, FCDA
officials gathered information on the effect o f the bomb on housing, food, shelters.

™ Federal Civil Defense Administration, Cue fo r Survival, (Washington: GPO, 1955), 1.
™ “Atom Show Fizzles Despite Top Billing,” Salt Lake Tribune, May 2, 1955.
Federal Civil Defense Administration, Cue fo r Survival, (Washington: GPO, 1955), 1.
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vehicles, and other products of everyday life. Over two hundred companies participated
in the civil effects tests by donating products.” ’
For Operation Cue, the FCDA constructed an entire city to serve as the laboratory
for the civil effects tests. Articles referred to the set-up alternately as “Survival City” and
“Doom Town,” pointing to two very different fates for the residents o f this representative
American city. An important component o f the test program measured the bomb’s effect
on clothing. Officially known as the “Thermal Ignition and Response o f Projects,” it
consisted o f a line of mannequins across the desert floor dressed in donated clothing.’*^
The imagery of the test is captivating: a line o f mannequins dressed in the latest
moderately priced fashion faced the 30-kiloton bomb. An image o f mannequins
following the detonation shows a not nearly as idyllic scene. Mannequins stood in
various states of dismemberment with tom clothing. The usage o f mannequins in both
Operation Doorstep and Operation Cue went beyond a desire to make the test houses
seem realistic. Civil defense officials intentionally dressed the mannequins and placed
them in typical positions to evoke images o f American families in suburban homes.
FCDA officials hoped such images would spur Americans to act. The mannequins
functioned as stand-ins for the Americans the FCDA imagined as their core constituency.

Ibid. Articles leading up to the test focused on the testing o f donated products. See for
example, “Effect o f Atomic Radiation on Furniture to be Tested,” Albuquerque Journal, Feb. 11, 1955.
Federal Civil Defense Administration, Operation Cue: The Atomic Test Program o f the
Federal Civil Defense Program, (Washington: GPO, 1955), 35.
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Figure 12- Operation Cue: The Atomic Test Program o f the Federal Civil Defense Program, 35.

Figure 13- Line o f manikins at 7,000 feet, part o f thermal radiation test (after blast). May 5,1955.
Record Group 304; Records o f the Office o f Civil and Defense Mobilization,
1947 - 1962, National Archives
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The FCDA released a booklet for the public about the test, Operation Cwe.” ® It
lauded the participation o f industry in the test. Just as in 1953, the National Automobile
Dealers Association provided automobiles for the test program, the L.A. Darling Co.
provided mannequins, and J.C. Penney outfitted them with clothing.” '’ The FCDA
reiterated the importance of private industry to the civil defense program. The official
book also summarized the state o f American civil defense in the book and called for a
reinvigoration of interest in preparedness. The book claimed that the time had come “for
a renewed effort, for a restudy o f local civil defense needs in terms o f new information,
and for a greater effort to show the people o f American how they can best prepare for
such individual and family protection.” ” ® The public book on Operation Cue contained
more detailed information than the Operation Doorstep book did; yet it failed to receive
much attention from any mainstream media outlets. The lack o f interest in Cue was owed
at least partially to the unreasonably small bomb used in the test. By the time the book
was printed, the Soviet’s first strike capabilities were exponentially more powerful than
the test bomb. The information contained in the book was out o f date before the bomb
was even detonated.
The FCDA released the Operation Cue film the same year. Officials attempted to
defuse the opposition to Operation Cue by adding a caveat to the film that recognized the
disparity between the 30-kiloton bomb used in Operation Cue and much more powerful

The FCDA and the AEG issued different types o f books and reports for the testing program.
Operation Cue was meant for public consumption, while Observer Handbooks were given to participants,
and a second book. Cue fo r Survival (Washington; GPO, 1955) focused on more technical details o f the
test.
Federal Civil Defense Administration, Operation Cue: The Atomic Test Program o f the
Federal Civil Defense Program, (Washington; GPO, 1955), 24.
Federal Civil Defense Administration, Operation Cue: Observer Handbook (Washington;
GPO, 1955), 3.
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H-bomb the Soviets were known to posses. The film acknowledged that the H-bomb
would exert 667 times more force as the 30-kiloton atomic bomb and begrudgingly
conceded that most o f the structures tested would have been completely obliterated had
an H-bomb been used. With that sticky issue resolved, the film moved on to recount the
Operation Cue program. A reporter, June Collin, narrated the film as it followed her
through the Nevada Test Site. She is shown examining the buildings and products to be
tested. She showed a particular interest in the mannequins, describing them as “Mr. and
Mrs. America,” and expressed curiosity about the effect o f the blast on the various
textiles and synthetic fabrics used in their clothing. She observed the detonation and
returned to visit the ruins o f the bombed town the following day. Collin ended the film
by offering viewers her conclusions about Operation Cue, “I took a last look at the debris
and devastation. This time it was only test, a well-planned test, not a real attack. It was
test o f the things we use in everyday life.” The film played upon the same tropes that
other civil defense materials used; that preparedness efforts were to be taken up by
individual families and that survival was possible through self-help. Calling the
mannequins “Mr. and Mrs. America” implied that they stood in for everyday Americans
in the blast. The types o f homes tested and even the placement o f the mannequins
conveyed a very clear notion o f who “Mr. and Mrs. America” was, leaving out
Americans outside o f suburban settings and nuclear families. The Operation Cue film
reinforced that idea that survival through civil defense was meant for ‘good’
Americans.” ®

Operation Cue, Federal Civil Defense Administration, 1955. Film footage is part o f the
Prelinger Archive and is available at www.archive.org.
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Operation Cue failed to gamer the attention that Operation Doorstep had just two
years earlier. The delays caused part o f the press’ animosity, but the irrelevant data was
the real source of the derision in their reports. Unlike Operation Doorstep that was used
as a promotional point for companies that donated to the test, donors did not include
information about their participation in advertisements following the test. The FCDA
moved away from massive efforts such as the atomic testing program, and instead
focused their efforts on first aid and the CONELRAD alert system.
Civil defense policies evolved as well, as the FCDA recognized evacuation as the
best form o f civil defense. The evacuation strategy made the information gathered in the
testing program at the Nevada Test Site obsolete. The FCDA focused its public
information campaigns on yearly mass evacuation drills called “Operation Alert.”
Civil defense testing continued at the Nevada Test Site with Operation Plumbbob
in 1957. FCDA official tested shelters and other structures.” ’ FCDA officials did little
to promote the exercise, it received very little attention in the press, and the FCDA did
not issue a commemorative book or movie for it as they had with Cue or Doorstep.
Smaller civil defense activities took place at the Nevada Test Site throughout the 1950s
and 60s, but were treated with scientific detachment by the press.
Operations Doorstep and Cue offered opportunities for companies and
organizations to contribute to the civil defense effort by donating products to the
programs. Retailers also used atomic themes to promote a product or generate business.
Stores often ran sales linked to atomic testing.” * The atomic bomb became

Corsbie, 3.
A. Costandina Titus, Bombs in the Backyard: Atomic Testing and American Politics (Reno:
University o f Nevada, Press, 2001), 93.
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sensationalized as a clever way to gain the attention o f fickle shoppers. These
contributions enhanced goodwill for business and industry and offered an opportunity for
the dissemination o f civil defense information outside official channels. This synergistic
relationship served both groups well during the 1953 exercise, but the increased
opposition to atomic testing by 1955 limited the potential to earn goodwill by donating
items to the program.
The FCDA’s testing program at the Nevada Test Site raises important questions
about whom the intended recipient for civil defense information was in the early Cold
War. Both series featured mannequin families that mirrored the ideal with a father,
mother, son, and daughter. The houses they populated resembled those found in
suburbia, well outside the critical targets identified by the FCDA and the programs
ignored densely populated urban cores. Films produced after the tests like “The House in
the Middle,” implied that those whose houses were destroyed brought the destruction
upon themselves because they were poor housekeepers or lived in slum-like conditions.
The optimistic and celebratory messages following the detonations helped downplay the
threats o f atomic war, a calm that lasted through much o f the 1950s, when events o f the
Cold War forced Americans to revisit civil defense.
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CHAPTER 6

PURCHASING SURVIVAL: PREPAREDNESS PRODUCTS
Entrepreneurial companies throughout the 1950s and 1960s took up the cause of
civil defense and sold products meant to aid in home preparedness. At the same time as
these products entered the marketplace, businesses and other groups took up the cause of
survival as a means o f generating goodwill for their firms. Together these two trends
were another means through which Americans were sold civil defense in the postwar
period. These efforts occurred outside the official purview o f the FCDA, yet they
contained many o f the same themes that underlay the Advertising Council’s public
service ads: they touted survivability, the importance o f self-help, and the family as the
core unit on the Cold W ar battlefield.
The exact reason companies took up the cause o f civil defense in the 1950s
varied; some companies saw an opportunity to rebrand existing products for the Atomic
Age, others invented new products to protect consumers from the dangers o f atomic
bombs, and finally other businesses took advantage o f the moment and distributed civil
defense information as a public service. Interest in civil defense by private companies
took many forms. Some companies produced straight informational material. Others
included simple civil defense messages in their regular advertisements to drum up
volunteers or promote events. Some companies used gimmicks to attract customers and
displayed items used in the civil defense items in shop windows; these sensationalist
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stunts were usually accompanied by a minimal amount o f education. Still other
companies linked their everyday products with the civil defense cause by showing how
they could be used in multiple ways to aid in survival. Despite the range in form and
content, a clear set o f messages about preparedness emerged from these materials. These
ads fell outside the control o f the Advertising Council or the FCDA, yet they largely
reflected the same themes that those campaigns set forth. They subscribed to the same
narrative: survival was likely and possible with modest financial investment and
commitment to education about the perils o f the Atomic Age. These advertisements
offered reassuring messages about the civil defense program. The FCDA encouraged
private companies to shoulder the burden for public education about preparedness. A
closer look at the ways in which private companies took up the cause o f civil defense
reveals just how quickly the idea o f citizen and consumer merged in the postwar period.
Throughout the 1950s, private companies produced and distributed materials
meant to educate Americans about civil defense in an effort to provide an important
public service. These materials took a variety o f forms, including straight informational
materials like pamphlets, comic books and other items aimed at children, and adding
information about preparedness to existing advertisements. The range in content and
form represented the various audiences they were intended to reach. Despite differing
designs, informational materials distributed by businesses largely followed the FCDA’s
script on survival. They also used imagery similar to that used in the Advertising
Council’s campaigns by showing survival for middle class American families. Closely
looking at these types of materials illustrates on ways that the message o f preparedness
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was presented to consumers in a variety o f forms and helps us locate the points at which
concepts of citizen and consumer overlapped in this period.
One o f the most prominent efforts at public education undertaken by private firms
in the era was the creation o f comic books and cartoons detailing the importance of
preparedness. These comics stumped for awareness about civil defense and aimed their
message at children. These efforts largely followed scripts similar to those used in
FCDA materials for children such as the Bert the Turtle cartoon. While the message was
altered for the youth audience, the comics followed the same narrative that adult
materials did, that civil defense was primarily an effort to be undertaken by suburban
families in their homes. One o f the earliest comics, “If An A-Bomb Falls,” emphasized
the need for civil defense and the dangers o f the Cold War. It read in part, “The
ambitions o f Communist dictators make the danger o f an atomic attack on our cities a
grave possibility.”” ® Reiterating the stance o f the FCDA, “If An A-Bomb Falls” told
readers that it was every citizen’s responsibility to be prepared. Another example, “The
H-Bomb and You,” from 1955 told the story o f a group o f students and their teacher
discussing civil defense preparedness. The comic held to the same gendered hierarchy
that dominated official civil defense material. The teacher listed appropriate jobs for the
female students such as working in welfare centers, mass feeding lines, and nursing. She
also told the girls that their mothers’ “job o f home defense is especially important.” The
male students are encouraged to help the civil defense effort by being messengers,
assisting in rescue work, aiding the block warden, and “keeping mother and dad
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‘If An A-Bomb Falls,” Quick Files; Box 6, Civil Defense Campaign- General (1), HSTL.
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interested in civil defense.” '®® “The H-Bomb and You” reflected an interest in children
as key to generating interest in civil defense. By telling the male students that they were
responsible for keeping their parents interested in civil defense, the comic shows how
material written for children was meant to indoctrinate both the youth and their
parents.'®' Comic strips in national newspapers also ran civil defense storylines. For
example, in 1956 A1 Capp “agreed to introduce an appropriate civil defense story line
into one o f his comic strips for a period o f 14-16 weeks” and lent one o f the characters
from his “Lil Abner” comic to serve as “Mr. Civil Defense.” The civil defense storylines
that appeared in comic strips contained the messages as official materials. Comic books
promoting civil defense were produced as the same time as other comics were beginning
to explore the dangers o f radiation and other science-fiction themes. When one compares
the great number of science fiction comics published to the relatively few on civil
defense, it becomes clear that Americans encoimtered a variety o f narratives about life in
the Atomic Age.
Many companies produced cards, booklets, posters, and other materials meant to
educate their customers about civil defense. These items offered a variety o f information
to recipients, including what to do in case o f an atomic attack, the meaning o f air-raid
siren wails, and basic first aid measures. These materials attempted to prepare Americans
for the seemingly inevitable attack to be launched by the Soviets. The Harrisburg
Railway Company distributed one o f the most striking examples o f this type o f materials

“The H-Bomb and You,” Virgil L. Couch Papers, 1951-1958 (Couch Papers); Box 21,
Miscellaneous Articles, Books, and Manuscripts Relating to Civil Defense, 1950-1958 (5), DDEL. The
comic was produced in full color by Commercial Comic, Inc. and distributed in cooperation with the
Washington Post.
JoAnne Brown, “A Is for Atom, B Is for Bomb: Civil Defense in American Public Education,
1948-1963,” Journal o f American History 75, no. 1 (1988), 70.
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in the form o f a two-sided circular dial titled, “You Can Survive an Atom Bomb.” The
dial contained “vital information, a combination o f basic facts as established by nuclear
physicists” on what to do in case o f an atomic bomb blast.

The text on the dial

admonished recipients to be prepared. On the back o f the dial, text encouraged recipients
to pray that God “strengthen our hearts” and “end forever all wars.” The two-sided dial
embodies an important contradiction in civil defense education throughout the period.
On the front, an atomic attack is presented as survivable if one only knows what to do.
The backside, however, reveals a much bleaker reality in which prayer for peace is the
only real chance for survival. This contradiction gets at the heart o f civil defense
planning throughout the Cold War. Despite the emphasis on survival from a variety of
sources, widespread recognition existed that total destruction would be the likely result of
an all-out war with the Soviets.

YOU can survive
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“You Can Survive an Atom Bomb,” Coucb Papers; Box 20, Civil Defense Publications by
Businesses and Corporations, 1950-1958 (6), DDEL.
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Another important effort companies undertook to educate consumers about civil
defense took the form o f reproducing and distributing educational materials with the
name of the sponsoring company included prominently somewhere on the copy. These
materials took little effort by the companies, but gave them a chance to enhance their
reputation with consumers for doing a public service. One example o f this type
promotion occurred in 1952 when International Latex Corporation reprinted and
distributed a letter from Philip Wylie on the need for civil defense “as a public service to
emphasize the need for preparation to cope with atomic warfare.” '®® Throughout its
existence, the FCDA relied on such cooperation to educate the public about civil defense.
These campaigns served the both the companies and the FCDA well. By framing their
efforts as doing a public service, the company improved its reputation. At the same time,
the FCDA relied on such efforts to spread effectively the civil defense messages in ways
its paltry budget did not allow it to do directly. These two aims converged in the
informational materials distributed by private companies. The expectation by the FCDA
for private companies to take on the important task of indoctrinating Americans on
preparedness and the fact that private companies willingly took it on helps expose the
growing relationship between politics and the marketplace that emerged in the years
following World War II.
Civil Defense Alert, August 1952, 3. Philip Wylie served in the FCDA’s Public Affairs
Division and witnessed the atomic tests as part o f the official delegation. His 1954 book Tomorrow!
detailed the destruction o f an atomic bomb attack on two fictional cities. In the city where residents
practiced good civil defense, most people survived, while the residents o f the second town who ignored
civil defense instructions perished. It was turned into a radio broadcast narrated by Orson Welles the
following year. In the early 1960s, Wylie opposed the civil defense policy o f borne fallout shelters saying,
“And certainly nobody in my family is thinking o f building a shelter, and if it would become a (mad) law
that we bad to, we would have to try to have the law revoked before engaging in such preposterous and
useless effort.” “Truth About Fallout Shelters,” Redbook, January 1962,43. He revisited civil defense in
bis 1963 book. Triumph. After a nuclear war, fourteen Americans survive in a shelter. Those who
survived in the shelter faced grave social ills such as alcoholism, prejudice, and infidelity. M. Nelson
Hayes, “W ylie’s Survivor’s o f the Qovdo,” Los Angeles Times, February 14, 1963, B14.
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Companies engaged in another important educational effort aimed specifically at
their customers and employees. The materials produced included posters, envelopes for
the storage o f civil defense information, and pamphlets and books. These materials, like
other privately financed efforts, cleaved to the official FCDA doctrine that preparedness
was a family affair. An envelope distributed by a telephone company illustrates that
point. The text on the front o f the envelope directed recipients to “file in it civil defense
information you receive in [the] future, after family discussion and deciding what YOU
will do to protect your family.” '®'* Companies did not ignore opportunities to combine
education and profit. Banks across the nation distributed plans and other information on
the construction o f home shelters. Not surprisingly, the banks were more than willing to
help their customers finance the construction costs.'®® Companies tried to maintain a
careful balance between education and profit in campaigns such as these. Many
companies also distributed informational material for their employees and their families.
These materials ranged from regular newsletters, to pamphlets, and whole books on the
importance o f home preparedness and also carried the message that survival was possible
for employees and their families.'®® A January 1957 bulletin to the employees o f Pacific
Gas and Electric is an example o f this type o f publication. On the cover, a little girl stood

Envelope— Chesapeake and Potomac Telephone Co. o f West Virginia, Couch Papers; Box 31,
Publications from Businesses and Corporations, 1958-1961 (1), DDEL. Another envelope at the archive
was a sample and instead o f a company’s name bad the filler o f “Blank Manufacturing Company,” Coucb
Papers; Box 13, Envelope for Family and Home Survival, DDEL.
“Suggestion for Your Fallout Shelter,” Coucb Papers; Box 36, Publications by Businesses and
Corporations Relating to Civil Defense, 1961-1963 (1), DDEL.
“Civil Defense Information for your family— prepared for the Employees o f Johnson Wax,”
Coucb Papers; Box 36, Civil Defense Publications and Materials from Businesses and Corporations, 19581961, (4), DDEL.
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holding a doll in the shadows o f bombed city.'®’ Despite the depressing cover, the text
inside reiterated FCDA claims that all that was needed for survival was a small amount o f
preparation. The production and distribution o f such materials shows how Americans
received messages about civil defense from a variety of sources. The consistency in
messages, no matter the source, shows how widespread the faith in survival became in
the 1950s. A closer reading of these materials, however reveal contradictions in their
messages, through disconnects between the images and texts, and raises doubt about how
much the recipients bought the claims that survival was possible.
The civil defense tests at the Nevada Test Site offered companies an opportunity
to connect themselves to the civil defense program. Companies used their participation
in the testing program to promote themselves and their products, and, to a lesser extent,
preparedness. These ads were less concerned with educating the public than the others
described here and strayed the farthest from official civil defense doctrine. One example
o f this type ran in the Los Angeles Times in 1953. In the ad, a group o f southern
California car dealers promised shoppers the opportunity to see “Atom Bombed Cars.”
In an attempt to avoid the appearance o f shameless promotion, the dealers also promised
information on the “best precautions if you are in your car during an atomic
explosion.” '®* This advertisement presents one way in which companies used their
participation in the testing program to their advantage. The car dealers were not
concerned with disseminating public information, but instead used the people’s interest in
the atomic bomb to attract shoppers to examine the “atom bombed cars.” J.C. Penney

“Emergency Procedures for P.G. and E. Personnel,” January 1957; Couch Papers; Box 21,
Miscellaneous Articles, Books, and Manuscripts Relating to Civil Defense, 1950-1958 (1), DDEL.
Los Angeles Times, May 23, 1953, 11. Articles also ran on their appearance. See for example,
“Atom-Bombed Cars Go On Display Today.” Los Angeles Times, May 22, 1953, 22.
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engaged in promotional programs with the mannequins used in the test program and
displayed them in shop windows and print advertisements for the store.

The displays

recreated the conditions o f the mannequins found following the blast.®®® These efforts
only marginally incorporated information on survival and instead focused on satisfying
the curiosity o f consumers. J.C. Penney also took advantage o f their donation o f clothing
to the test program at the Nevada Test Site and ran ads with the mannequins and lists of
the clothing that best withstood the atomic bomb tests. Advertisements such as these
used graphic images from the civil defense testing program and attempted to appeal to
people’s curiosity. While they were most interested in stimulating interest in a product or
company, ads o f this nature also maintained a certain amount o f educational intent by
including a minimum amount o f civil defense information.

One ad in particular was a two-page pictorial o f mannequins before and after tbe blast. Tbe
copy o f tbe ad said, “Tbese mannikins (sic) could bave been live people, in fact, they could bave been you.
Volunteer now for Civil Defense.” Tbe ad not only described tbe way tbe clothing withstood tbe blast, but
also gruesomely recounted tbe fate o f tbe various mannequins describing in explicit detail tbe ways in
which tbe mannequins lost or broke limbs and other injuries. Las Vegas Review-Journal, April 3, 1953, 34.
200

‘Doom Town Residents.” Los Angeles Examiner, April 1, 1953, 1-3.
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Figure 15- Los Angeles Times, May 23,1 9 5 3 ,1 1 .

Some companies sought to take advantage o f the interest in the civil defense by
linking their products with preparedness. These advertisements pointed to secondary
uses for everyday products in the preparation for atomic war. One example o f this type
o f ad ran for a reflective paint called Scotchlite, manufactured by 3M. The ad, entitled,
“To sell a drink or save a city,” showed two billboards that both used Scotchlite: one for
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Coca-Cola and a highway sign about civil defense.®®' By positioning Scotchlite as able
to sell Coca-Cola or help a community in case o f an atomic attack, the ads illustrates how
civil defense entered the marketplace. Other ads offered information about local civil
defense efforts as well as asserting their products usefulness in home preparedness. One
ad o f this style for Levelor Venetian blinds stated that the blinds could shield residents
from bomb fragments and debris in case o f an atomic attack. It included a list o f civil
defense warden districts for the local area and available volunteer positions.®®® The
Levelor ad balanced public information and promotion o f the blinds by positing that the
blinds could be useful in protecting one’s home in case o f atomic attack and by stressing
the need for volunteers. This ad and others like it connected the cause o f civil defense
with the growing consumer market in the United States following World W ar II.
Non-consumer products also dominated the civil defense market in the early years
of the Cold War. Companies that produced goods used in citywide civil defense efforts,
such as air raid sirens and radio communication systems, also ran advertisements touting
their products’ contribution to the area’s safety.®®® Other industries, less directly tied to
civil defense efforts, publicized their utility in preparing for possible attack. Telephone
companies in particular took advantage o f this added promotion. Phone companies, such
as Illinois Bell and Pacific Telephone ran regular ads that included information about
expanding phone service and their important role in civil defense. Illinois Bell even
included information about ‘tele-tags’ for children in their ads, citing the importance of

“Say it in Scotchlite,” Quick Files; Box 6, Civil Defense Campaign- General (2), HSTL.
Levelor ad, Quick Files; Box 1, Civil Defense- Miscellaneous, HSTL.
An example o f this ad appeared in the Civil Defender, August 1957,15. In the ad, a panicked
broadcaster appears with tbe siren in background and tbe text “get ‘em to tbe radio!” Other ads o f this
nature appeared regularly in tbe Los Angeles Times for Motorola sirens.
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identification tags and the added ease o f adding your home number.^^"* Other ads
included information on what to do in case o f an emergency, which, ironically, included
not using home telephones. One particularly engaging advertisement from Ohio Bell, a
puzzle for children, entitled “The CD Story” said that the coordination o f civil defense
activities depended on effective communications that were built on good telephone
facilities.^®^ Much as the advertisements created for the Advertising Council merged
private interests with the larger public good, telephone companies took advantage o f civil
defense as a means o f building support for their industry.
Mass media outlets also took advantage of the interest in civil defense drive sales.
Magazines especially used civil defense related articles as headlines and promoted these
issues in other outlets. When Collier’s produced an issue in 1951 dedicated to the “War
We Do Not Want” including an article about the devastating costs o f a fictional A-bomb
strike on New York, they took out ads in a number o f major newspapers.^®^ Throughout
the 1950s, magazines promoted ‘special issues’ that promised to give readers needed
advice on what to do in case o f attack. These articles and issues often included content
written by the FCD A and reinforced the message that survival was possible. By the early
1960s, the support that editors had for the FCDA dissipated and the mood in most

Chicago Tribune, March 16, 1954, 16.
“The Civil Defense Story,” Couch Papers; Box 21, Miscellaneous Articles, Books, and
Manuscripts Relating to Civil Defense, 1950-1958 (1), DDEL.
The New York Times, Los Angeles Times, and Chicago Tribune each ran the same ad for the
magazine: Chicago Tribune, October 19, 1951; New York Times, October 19, \9 5 \, Los Angeles Times,
October 21, 1951. The pattern was repeated for a number o f Collier's issues related to civil defense. Other
magazines like Redbook, the Saturday Evening Post, and US News and World Report also followed the
same pattern.
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mainstream magazines shifted away from articles supporting the civil defense program to
ones berating the government and questioning the prudence of shelter building?®^
While some companies simply provided civil defense information in their ads,
other companies took advantage of international tensions and sold products meant to aid
in survival of an atomic attack. The market for these items ebbed and flowed during the
1950s and 1960s, rising to match increased political tensions, and falling during periods
of relative calm in international politics. The interest in such products did not suddenly
appear during the Cold War, but such products had virtually disappeared from the
marketplace and national conversation following World War 11.^®* In 1950, fear
following the Soviet testing o f an atomic bomb blew open the survival market. The
Soviet Union’s detonation of their own atomic bomb in September o f 1949 and the
invasion of South Korea by North Korea in 1950 prompted Americans to consider the
possibility o f an attack on their home soil. The federal government responded to such
concerns by establishing the FCDA and the marketplace saw the emergence of products
meant to protect Americans from the A-bomb. Retailers o f survival products published
summaries of their offerings in magazines, newspapers, and trade journals. Through
these advertisements, private companies sold Americans a concept o f civil defense
largely based on the official policy o f family-based defense.
With the possibility for an all-out war with the Soviet Union looming,
entrepreneurial companies began marketing home bomb shelters. Largely based on the

By the early 1960s, even the most fervent civil defense proponents questioned the program.
The Saturday Evening Post ran a number o f articles including, “The Case Against Fallout Shelters,”
(March 31, 1962, 8-9) that opposed the fallout shelter program.
The Readers ’ Guide to Periodical Literature lists no articles between 1945 and September
1950 on shelters.
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shelters constructed in Western Europe during World War II, these shelters promised
protection from the blast of an A-bomb. During the early 1950s, a majority o f civil
defense articles focused on such shelters.

Companies sold plans for the construction

of private, family shelters. These shelters promised to “protect you against death and
danger o f flying glass, debris, and collapsing buildings as a result o f atom or hydrogen
b o m b s . B u i l d i n g on the FCDA’s model o f the family as the core unit in the Cold
War, shelter advertisements used the family to encourage purchase and compared shelters
to life insurance. An ad for the Lifesafe Atomic Bomb Shelter used an image o f a
mother, baby, two children, and the family dog running into an underground shelter to
shill their product. Copy accompanying the image tugged at the heartstrings o f parents
saying, “O f course you love your children! Even though you may not be concerned with
your own safety, you’re bound to be concerned with your youngsters'! D on’t let them
down- but provide them with the comfort and security that they expect from you.”^'*
While these early shelters lacked the sophistication o f the shelters promoted in the early
1960s during the fallout shelter boom, they did offer moderate protection from the blast
and heat wave. The bomb shelters of the 1950s fared poorly in the marketplace and the
market quickly dried up.^’^ More important than the technical specifications of the bomb
shelters is the way that manufacturers positioned their product in the marketplace.
Companies manipulated the emphasis on family togetherness during the period to

“West Coast Gets Ready,” Life. March 12, 1951, 64. “Wonderful to Play In,” Time, February
5, 1951. “A Place to Hide,” Time, December 18, 1950.
New York Times, November 1, 1953, S13.
Los Angeles Times, February 1, 1951, 28.
“Would-Be Shelter Mogul Folds Up,” New York Times, September 11, 1951, 24.
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encourage purchase of the shelters. The focus on family shelters as a refuge for suburban
families carried into marketing strategies for fallout shelters in the early 1960s.
Other companies marketed products that they claimed could provide protection
from the atomic bomb. Ads made outlandish claims that even the limited knowledge
available at the time would have discredited. These products played upon some
Americans’ fundamental fear of an atomic attack. One such product, the Atomicape,
promised to shield those unlucky enough to be outside a shelter when the bomb struck.
The product, essentially a plastic sheet, was meant to be used as covering during an
attack. The ad played on apocalyptic fears saying, “It could happen tomorrow!”
Curiously, though, the ad promises other applications for the cape “should we be
fortunate enough to be spared the death, destruction, and disease of an atom bomb, the
Atomicape has hundreds o f other convenient uses.”^*^ Ads for products like the
Atomicape reinforced many o f the policies underlying the civil defense program by
chiding customers that they must be prepared and promising that survival could be
guaranteed through preparation. O f course, the manufacturers o f products like the
Atomicape had a financial interest in convincing customers that survival was possible.
The market for survival products never took off in the 1950s. Americans spent their
money purchasing the newly available consumer goods for their homes. Despite the low
consumption o f these products, they point to another way that survival became
entrenched in the marketplace. Further, advertisements for early shelters firmly
established the suburban family as the market for shelters, an idea that dominated the
market through 1963.

213

Los Angeles Times, February 15, 1951, B2.
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Throughout the 1950s and early 1960s, advertisements appeared for services and
products meant to aid in the continuation o f society in case o f an attack. For the most
part, these ads were not meant for consumers, but instead for government and industry
planners. As the Cold W ar with the Soviet Union continued, cities and businesses
recognized the importance of comprehensive disaster planning. New companies sprung
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up to take advantage of the new market and developed underground storage facilities to
house copies o f essential records outside o f targeted areas.^’"^ To aid in the moving and
storage o f documents, such sites partnered with companies like Bell and Howell to
microfilm records prior to their storage. The FCDA applauded such efforts and even
worked with Burroughs, an electronics and computer company, to produce the film
“Bomb P ro o f’ starring Walter Abel. The film chronicled the “survival o f a city after an
H-bomb demolishes its principal industry.” Businesses and government in the town face
the destruction with cautious optimism because they microfilmed important records and
the film ends with a promise to rebuild.”^

Promotional material about the film

identified civic groups, sales groups, trade associations, schools and colleges, 4-H clubs,
women’s clubs, farm organizations, veterans’ organizations, and business and labor
groups as the intended viewers o f the film. The anticipated audience points to an
important secondary purpose o f the film. While Burroughs had a vested interested in
encouraging various entities to rent underground storage space, the real purpose o f the
film was to convince viewers that they and their communities could survive an atomic
bomb blast and that society would continue in a relatively normal state following the
attack. Other ads pointed out the way that everyday industry could be converted to the
civil defense recovery effort in case o f an attack. These ads, while not selling anything
for the average consumers, had a secondary intent to convince Americans that their
communities could withstand a Soviet attack and emerge victorious.

Why Industries in the field o f production for defense should go underground,” Couch Papers;
Box 32, Publications froiii Businesses and Corporations, 1958-1961(6), DDEL; Iron Mountain
Underground Storage Vaults, Couch Papers; Box 20, Civil Defense Publications by Businesses and
Corporations, 1950-1958 (3), DDEL.
“Burroughs Presents Bomb Proof starring Walter Abel,” Couch Papers; Box 20, Civil Defense
Publications by Businesses and Corporations, 1950-1958 (8), DDEL.

98

Entrepreneurial companies marketed identification tags for children to school
districts and worried parents as another important product meant to aid in most attack
recovery. Advertisements for the tags held that they would aid in the reuniting o f
children with their parents following an attack. Press reports and advertisements
carefully avoided any other scenarios, never acknowledging that the tags could be used to
identify dead and disfigured bodies following an attack. These materials championed the
tags for the sense o f protection they offered children in light o f possible atomic war.^*^
Promotional materials for the tags featured grinning youths posing with their tags around
their necks. Tag companies targeted schools, PTAs, church groups, and other civic
groups to outfit children for the Cold War.

National School Studios, the company

responsible for school portraits for children across the nation, came up with an innovative
marketing strategy for tags. The company used school photos o f the children and sold
paper tags for students that featured the child’s photo and address. Schools could
purchase the tags outright for sixty cents each, but National School Studios would give
them to the school for ifee if school administrators would allow the studio to send an
envelope o f pictures, with no obligation, to the children’s parents for purchase.
Promotional materials for the programs featured a grinning student proudly wearing her
tag.

The creative financing o f the tag program highlights one way that companies

took advantage o f the goodwill generated by promoting civil defense and also aimed to
earn a profit.

Winkler, 115.
Los Angeles Times, May 15,1955, L70.
Civil Defender, October 1955, 2.
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Figure 17- 1955 Advertisement for Tags, Civil Defender, October 1955, p.2.

Messages about civil defense appeared in advertisements for other products only
tangentially related to the program as well. Toy companies took advantage o f the
national interest in civil defense and manufactured toys that recreated the tools of
survival. Manufacturers attempted to involve children in civil defense through the
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creation of realistic toys for young boys. A Christmas-time Sears Roebuck and Co. ad
featured a “complete civil defense center in m i n i a t u r e . I n the 1960s, during the height
o f the fallout shelter boom, W ham -0, the company responsible for the Hula-Hoop and
Frisbee, manufactured a build it yourself bomb shelter for children.^^^ Such toys
appeared alongside toys reproducing the tools o f uranium mining, civil defense’s less
threatening cousin. Other toys for children used the image o f the atom and mushroom
cloud to increase appeal. These objects prove useful in understanding the ways children
were educated about the atomic bomb and how private companies used atomic imagery
and civil defense to sell products. Toys such as these fed into the idea that civil defense
was an important practice, but that an atomic bomb attack could be survived
While the FCDA attempted to escape politics and frame itself as a public good,
civil defense became an important bargaining chip in political campaigns. Campaign ads
carried images o f destruction and spoke o f the potential destruction o f an attack on a
particular jurisdiction. In 1962, a “worried mother” ran ads for Richard Nixon’s
gubernatorial campaign in California citing a number o f reasons why Nixon was the right
choice for “mothers and grandmothers concerned about the future o f their children”
including the candidate’s guarantee to strengthen civil defense programs.^^* The
presence o f civil defense in political campaign ads is not surprising, but the similarities
between the imagery and rhetoric in campaign ads and other non-political ads points to

Los Angeles T/wej, November 18, 1956, 16.
The toy retailed for SI 19 and was reportedly a flop. Douglas Martin, “Richard Knerr, 82,
Crazed Creator, Dies,” New York Times, January 18, 2008.
Los Angeles Times, November 5, 1962, D4. Lisa McGirr’s Suburban Warriors (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 2001) describes the ways the conservative right took rose to power in southern
California based on the grassroots movements o f people such as this “worried mother.”
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the merging o f the government and private enterprise in the years following World War
II.
The marketing o f civil defense during the 1950s reflected the cycles o f apathy that
plagued civil defense officials throughout the decade. When tensions ran high, the
number o f survival products marketed and the number o f other goods invoking civil
defense messages increased. When tensions eased, advertisers focused more on the good
life promised by the expanding economy. The marketing o f civil defense, through
products meant to aid in survival and in public service type ads, drew on the real
relationship between politics and the marketplace. Examining the content o f such
promotional campaigns, reveals how civil defense helped transform consumption into a
measure o f good citizenship.
By the late 1950s, advertisements for civil defense products nearly disappeared
from the marketplace. This downturn in interest was due to waning interest as
international tensions come to a relative peace.

In addition to the decrease in attention

to civil defense, a number of groups emerged in the mid-and late-1950s that vocalized
concern about nuclear weapons and the value o f American civil defense. The recognition
that fallout posed a significant danger following the 1954 Bravo Test in the Pacific led to
a spate o f articles questioning the prudence o f current civil defense policy and the
possibilities for s u r v i v a l . T h e mid-1950s also saw a rise in the number o f protests of

John Gregory Stocke, "Suicide on the Installment Plan": Cold-War Era Civil Defense and
Consumerism in the United States,” in The Writing on the Cloud: American Culture Confronts the Atomic
Bomb, Alison M. Scott and Christopher D. Geist, eds., (Lanham: University Press o f America, 1997), 44—
60.
Perhaps most remembered from the Bravo shot was the plight o f the Japanese fishermen on the
Lucky Dragon. The boat was at sea about 23 miles away from the site o f the detonation and the fishermen
suffered from a series o f medial problems and the fish were also contaminated. A. Costandina Titus,
Bombs in the Backyard: Atomic Testing and American Politics (Reno: University o f Nevada, Press, 2001),
49.
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nuclear weapons testing by groups like SANE. These protest movements helped shift the
national dialogue from a belief that survival was possible through modest preparation to a
call for the cessation o f nuclear weapons testing.^^"* The interest in civil defense products
and information reflected the larger geopolitical trends and increased when tensions
heightened. In 1958, the moratorium between the United States and the Soviet Union on
aboveground nuclear weapons testing essentially squelched national discourse on civil
defense. Cities and the federal government maintained their civil defense infrastructure,
but refocused their preparedness efforts on natural disasters.
The close o f the 1950s saw a reinvigoration o f debate about civil defense as the
Berlin Crisis made the possibility o f war with the Soviet Union again seem like a real
possibility. As civil defense once again entered national discussion, it moved
underground to family fallout shelters in basements and backyards. Marked by
dissension and debate, civil defense in the early 1960s reflected the heated moment and
the eventual official recognition that the ability to survive nuclear war was tenuous at
best.

^ For a discussion o f Women Strike for Peace and the SANE movement see, Dee Garrison,
Bracing fo r Armageddon: Why Civil Defense Never Worked (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press,
2006); Dee Garrison, “Our Skirts Gave Them Courage: The Civil Defense Protest Movement in New York
City, 1955-1961,” in Not June Cleaver: Women and Gender in Postwar America, 1945-1960, edited by
Joanne Meyerowitz (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1994).
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CHAPTER 7

GOING UNDERGROUND: FALLOUT SHELTERS AND
THE END OF CIVIL DEFENSE
The first years o f the 1960s saw a dramatic shift in national civil defense efforts.
Shelters, which had been virtually ignored since the early 1950s, were resurrected as the
centerpiece o f national civil defense efforts. Improved understanding o f the nature of
fallout and increased tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union led to a
reinvigoration o f the survival market. Companies no longer touted products meant to
provide protection from radiation; instead, they developed numerous variations on the
fallout shelter and products meant to stock them. New national civil defense policy
emphasized the construction of home fallout shelters meant to house families for fourteen
days, the length o f time needed for the greatest threat o f radiation poisoning to pass,
following a blast. Shelters raised questions about the spirit o f community and what post
attack America would look like. The popular press ran articles about the morality of
shelters and their benefits.^^^ The rise o f the fallout shelter as the best hope for survival
prompted debate on the cost o f survival for Americans.
The fallout shelter ‘boom’ received a great deal o f media attention.
Advertisements for plans to construct one’s own shelter, to purchase pre-fabricated ones,
hire a contractor, or move into a new home pre-equipped with a fallout shelter frequently
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appeared in newspapers and magazines. Television, magazines, and newspapers all ran a
number o f reports about fallout shelters, but the messages were divided between ones
staunchly supporting the move toward fallout shelters, with others calling the program
absurd and immoral. Narratives appeared in the popular press questioning the prudence
o f shelter building. Other articles focused on the livability and decoration o f shelters.
Advertisements and articles also pointed out the multiple uses for the shelter during
peacetime; it could be used as storage space, a den, or a rumpus room for children. The
promotion and debate surrounding fallout shelters in the early 1960s highlights the
connections between the international tensions o f the Cold War and domestic politics and
culture. The campaigns for fallout shelters also raised important questions about family
and self-help, just as the earlier campaigns for civil defense did. The debate surrounding
fall-out shelters, however, exposes the ways that the good-life image o f the 1950s became
fractured by the mid-1960s. The bust o f the fallout shelter market by 1963 marked the
beginning o f the end o f the “victory culture” that had defined American culture following
World War
The fallout shelter emerged as the best hope for survival by the end o f the 1950s.
With the recognition that the real threat was fallout, planners realized that long-term
seclusion in shelters would be the only way to protect Americans from radiation. The
fallout shelter represented a departure from earlier policies. Early civil defense policy
recommended shelters, but those were meant to shield occupants from the immediate
blast and heat wave and not for long-term occupancy. By the mid-1950s, policy shifted
^ The idea o f victory culture is explored in Tom Engelhardt’s book, The End o f Victory Culture:
Cold War America and the Disillusioning o f a Generation (Amherst: University o f Massachusetts Press,
1998). In it, he argues that the postwar period in the United States centers on the victory o f the United
States in World War II. The flipside to the victory culture is a sense o f despair that eventually overtakes
the exuberance o f victory.
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to dispersal and evacuation as the primary means of preparedness and survival. As
weapons grew exponentially in strength, policymakers were forced to recognize the
futility o f evacuation as a strategy. New civil defense plans called for the construction of
fallout shelters in office buildings, stores, schools, and other public spaces. In addition to
the public shelters, civil defense officials encouraged Americans to construct home
fallout shelters. In 1958, a new federal agency was put in charge o f civil defense. The
creation o f the Office o f Civil Defense and Mobilization (OCDM) merged domestic civil
defense and military defense in one office. The OCDM offered instructions for the
construction o f home fallout shelters.^^^
The Family Fallout Shelter, first produced in June 1959, detailed the official
position on s h e l t e r s . I t began with a statement from acting director o f civil defense,
Leo Hoegh, about the need for shelters

In a departure from earlier civil defense

informational material, he recognized the certain death o f people near ground zero o f the
blast. He argued, though, that “many more millions- everybody else- could be threatened
by radioactive fallout.” To combat the threat o f fallout, the OCDM called on Americans
to construct home fallout shelters. According to The Family Fallout Shelter, the threat o f
fallout could not be localized to critical target areas. The book offered detailed plans for
five different models to shield families from the harmful effects o f radioactivity. It ended

The responsibility for civil defense changed hands several times in the late 1950s-early 1960s.
In 1958, the Federal Civil Defense Administration and the Office o f Defense Mobilization merged, creating
the Office o f Civil and Defense Mobilization (OCDM). In 1961, President Kennedy moved responsibility
for civil defense to the Department o f Defense.
Office o f Civil Defense and Management, The Family Fallout Shelter (Washington: GPO,
1959).
Hoegh’s interest in fallout shelters went beyond his role as director o f the OCDM. He also
served as Vice-president o f Wonder Building Corporation who manufactured fallout shelters. Kenneth
Rose, One Nation Underground, 80; “Charges Ike and Cashes in on Shelters,” Chicago Tribune, April 6,
1962; “Boom to Bust,” Time, May 18, 1962.
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with instructions about living in a shelter and included a list o f necessary supplies.
Rationing, housekeeping, and clearly delineated roles for each family member were
needed to guarantee survival in the shelter. The Family Fallout Shelter, much like earlier
civil defense materials placed the family at the center o f civil defense efforts.
Advertisements for shelters also relied on the family to sell shelters. Newspaper
advertisements for shelters often appeared on pages for new home developments and
other household products. Construction companies and pool builders branched out into
the fallout shelter business. The ads touted adherence to the OCDM ’s standards for
fallout shelters. Perhaps recognizing the limited appeal o f a fallout shelter, advertisers
promoted their multiple uses. One company in Los Angeles, Horn Brothers, sold a
“combination fallout shelter and family room” that would not “mar the beauty o f your
home.”^^° Another company offered shelters creatively named “Safety Dens, a survival
shelter with peacetime use as a den, playroom, etc.”^^' The Safety Den could be built
with 100% FHA financing beneath a garage or patio. Most ads for fallout shelters
included images of nuclear families occupying in the shelters. The accompanying text
spoke to the need to protect one’s family in light o f information released by the OCDM
on the harmful effects o f fallout.
Other entrepreneurial companies constructed homes and apartments with pre
installed shelters. Builders offered up shelters as one more feature o f their new
development. In southern California, the builders of Sunset Conejo, a large tract of
houses, ran a number of ads in early 1961 encouraging people to visit the new
development. The ads talked about the spacious homes, their distance from the smog of
Los Angeles Times, June 5, 1960, K17.
Los Angeles Times, February 19, 1961, SG8.
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downtown, and the peace of mind o f having a “family-size. Civil Defense approved
Fallout Shelter.”^^^ Another advertisement for the development offered an even more
frightening message for potential homebuyers. A white mushroom cloud against a black
background with the words, “H-Bomb? Survive” encouraged families to look at the
houses o f Sunset Conejo.^^^ Nearly the entire ad is consumed by its insistence on the
need for home fallout shelters. Fallout protection is touted as the most valuable feature of
the development. The ad reads, “Family protection is as basic as a build-in at Sunset
Conejo and the Dales as your range, oven, or disposal, it’s optional o f course, but you
can’t afford to go without this survival feature, only $1,100.”^^"^ Apartment builders also
promoted their buildings with “subterranean civil defense fallout s h e l t e r s . F o r a brief
period in the early 1960s, the need for fallout protection merged with the growing
housing market. For some developers, fallout shelters represented one more way to
distinguish their model home from the rest.

Los Angeles Times, February 26, 1961,110.
Los Angeles Times, March 19, 1961, W S ll.
Los Angeles Times, March 19, 1961, W S ll.
Los Angeles Times, August 19, 1962, W S ll.
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For any fallout shelter to provide long-term protection it needed to be stocked
with food, water, and other necessities. Companies sold survival kits on the assumption
that little could be done to prepare. The ad copy for one such kit, the Nuclear Attack
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Survival Kit, extolled Americans to wake up because “Your time is running out!”^^^
Shelter kits proliferated and nearly all the advertisements focused on the inevitability of
an attack. Other goods, previously sold for camping, became rebranded as ideal for the
home fallout shelter. Companies sold home Geiger counters to be included in every
shelter. One such device, the Nu-Klear Fallout Detector, promised to detect fallout from
a nuclear bomb. Advertisements for the device guilted householders into buying it
saying, “It would be better to know at a price this low, no man can afford not to give his
family this protection.”^^^ Home Geiger counters often showed families using the
devices and focused on their ease o f use. The proper use o f the instruments promised
survival. Stores sold portable radios, ventilation systems, and air filters to make the
fourteen-day stay in the shelter safe. Advertisements for fallout shelters and products for
them carried similar imagery to the ads for civil defense products in the 1950s as the
image o f home and family as the front line o f defense remained constant, but they were
nearly devoid of the optimistic tone that pervaded earlier advertisements. Advertisers
recognized the heavy cost associated with fallout shelters. Shelters were not an easy sale.
Two weeks in a cramped space, with limited food, no running water, or fresh air was not
nearly as simple a solution to the threat o f war as the Atomicape had been ten years
earlier.^^* In addition to the difficult stay in the shelter, questions remained about what
kind o f neighborhood and community Americans would face after emerging from the
“Nuclear Attack Survival Kits,” Couch Papers; Box 36, Publications by Businesses and
Corporations Relating to Civil Defense, 1961-1963 (3), DDEL.
“Now You Can Be Prepared,” New York Times, October 19,1963,11.
Despite overwhelming scientific evidence about the dangers o f fallout, some entrepreneurs
continued to market products similar to the Atomicape. Fallout suits were plastic full body suits meant to
“protect against deadly radiation while traveling to a shelter, or to allow the person to leave such protection
to get needed supplies or to carry out rescue work;” “New Products,” Los Angeles Times, December 11,
1961, C l 1. Time Magazine derided the suits saying they provide “no more protection against radiation
than a raincoat.” “The Sheltered Life,” Time, October 20, 1961.
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shelter. These questions pervaded the advertisements for shelters as manufacturers made
the case that they were the best hope in the face o f a terrible threat. Fallout shelter
companies were continually charged with taking advantage o f helpless citizens during a
time o f crisis.^^® Some companies went as far as to stress that they sold their shelters at a
fair price. Radiation Shelters, Inc. in California ran advertisements stating that, because
it was their “patriotic duty to not accept an excess profit in a case directly concerned with
possible national disaster or survival,” they would only earn 150 dollars in profit on each
shelter.^'^'^ While the image o f the family safe in an underground bunker resembled
earlier messages about survival, a closer reading reveals deep-seated unease about the
costs o f survival.
The benefit o f fallout shelters weighed heavily on the minds o f Americans in the
early 1960s. Mass media articles focused on the financial and moral costs o f living a
sheltered-centered s o c i e t y A Time article from October o f 1961, “The Sheltered
Life,” summarized the tensions inherent in the shift toward private, home shelters.^'^^ The
article focused on the “profiteering” o f shelter manufacturers. Other articles questioned
the use o f the family in advertisements for shelters. Redbook ran an article that
questioned the imagery o f family used by fallout shelter manufacturers saying, “Life in a
private fallout shelter would bear little relation to the reassuring picture that the public is

“Some Ground Rules for the Shelter Trade,” Consumer Reports, February 1962, 98. The
article reports that the Federal Trade Commission issued rules for the advertisement o f fallout shelters.
Consumer Reports fails to list any o f the requirements and instead listed a series o f grievances committed
by manufacturers toward consumers and calls for greater consumer protection laws.
The shelters were advertised for $1995. Los Angeles Times, November 5, 1961, 39.
Arthur Waskow, “Shelter-Centered Society,” Scientific American, May 1962, 34.
“The Sheltered Life,” Time, October 20, 1961. Time ran an advertisement for the issue in the
New York Times calling civil defense “the second deterrent” and that the issue would tell readers “what
shelters can and cannot do for his family.” New York Times, October 16, 1961, 60.
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now being offered by some o f the companies selling these shelters. The happy image of
father, mother, and all the children sitting snugly together in their new convertible
gameroom-shelter, first-aid kit ready but unused, is based on several assumptions that
may be grossly i n a c c u r a t e . A r t i c l e s appeared in various magazines opposing the
shelter p r o g r a m . R e l i g i o u s periodicals also published articles calling for renewed
efforts for peace and opposing the fallout shelter program.^'^^ Scientific magazines
largely opposed the shelter program.^^^ Questions about the fallout shelter program
entered national dialogue in the 1960s, and civil defense policymakers worked to dispel
the negative messages in mass media as well as fight public apathy toward the program.
In 1961, they published a pamphlet. Facts and Fiction About Home Fallout Shelters, that
Truth About Fallout Shelters,” Redbook, January 1962, 73.
“Let’s Stop the Fallout Shelter Folly!” Good Housekeeping, February 1962. Farm Journal
published an article calling to question the dual-purpose nature o f fallout shelters saying calling them the
“family room o f tomorrow” was a “sugar-coated label” and that Americans ought to reject fallout shelters
on the basis that they made idea o f atomic warfare acceptable. The article ended by asking, “If w e’re
reduced again to war— this time by bombs that obliterate all life— does it matter if we survive at all?”
“Family Room o f Tomorrow,” Farm Journal, March 1960, 132. Other examples include, “Fallout
Shelters; Dig We Must?,” Newsweek, October 02, 1961,24; “Speaking Out (Case Against Fallout
Shelters),” Saturday Evening Post, March 31, 1962, 8; “Moral Dilemma o f Fallout Shelters,” Semor
Scholastic, November 29, 1961, 15-19; “Gun Thy Neighbor,” Time, August 18, 1961, 58; and “Shelter
Skelter,” Time, September 1, 1961, 59.
See for example “Ethics at the Shelter Doorway,”
September 30, 1961, 824; and
“Shelter Debate,” America, July 28, 1962, 543. Other liberal religious periodicals like Christian Century
and Commonweal also ran articles opposing the fallout shelter program. See for example, “Urgently
Needed an Ethics for Moles,” Christian Century, August 23, 1961, 1006; “Fallout Shelter is Our God,”
Christian Century, March 7, 1962, 293; and “Lines for a Dedication o f a Fallout Shelter,” Commonweal,
October 12, 1962, 73.
^ The Bulletin o f Atomic Scientists published articles opposing the fallout shelter program as
incapable o f protecting Americans from the dangers o f nuclear war. “Thoughts on Bomb Shelters,” The
Bulletin o f Atomic Scientists, March 1962, 14; “More Important than Shelters,” The Bulletin o f Atomic
Scientists, April 1962, 8; and “Do We Want Fallout Shelters?,” The Bulletin o f Atomic Scientists, February
1963,24. The opposition o f The Bulletin o f Atomic Scientists to civil defense planners’ move to fallout
shelters was a complete reversal o f their position o f the 1950s o f supporting the FCDA and running a
number o f articles written by FCDA officials. Other scientific publications echoed the claims that
underground shelters came with a heavy price for humanity. “Effective Bomb Shelters Could Destroy Man
Kind,” Science News Letter, March 17, 1962, 168. Science News Letter offered the most contradictory
articles on fallout shelters, less than six months earlier they ran an article, “Fallout Shelters’ ‘Lived-In’
Look” singing the praises o f the home fall-out shelter and offering directions at “turning a sheltered into a
study, a den, a guest room, a stereo Hi-Fi room, or a utility room.” Science News Letter, October 14, 1961,
258.
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laid out a number of fallacies in the popular press about the home shelter, and urged
Americans to build shelters?"^^ The booklet claimed, “The major harrier to public
understanding o f the need for a massive self-help family fallout shelter campaign
continues to he the inability o f most people to separate the facts and fiction about
survival, coupled with a sense o f utter frustration and futility regarding their ability to do
anything worthwhile.”^*'* Constant scrutiny o f the benefits o f the fallout shelter, charges
of profiteering by manufacturers, and a general apathy toward to civil defense
preparedness created a limited market for shelters.
Despite the buzz about fallout shelters, few Americans actually constructed them.
Public opinion surveys conducted in 1963 following the Cuban Missile Crisis pointed to
a new lull in interest on civil defense. Only twenty-five percent o f respondents said that
they had thought about building s h e l t e r s . E v e n with the lack o f interest in constructing
shelters, most respondents were in favor o f fallout s h e l t e r s . T h e disconnect identified
in this poll, between the lack o f construction o f shelters by Americans and a faith in
shelters, gets hack at the fundamental problem that plagued civil defense officials from
the beginning. While most Americans could believe that survival might he possible
through preparation, few were willing to invest their own resources in guaranteeing that
survival. American consumers had lingering doubts about the possibility o f survival.

National Defense Department, Chamber o f Commerce o f the United States, “Fiction and Facts
about Family Fallout Shelters” (Washington: n.p., 1961).
^ Ibid.
Gene N. Levine and John Modell, “American Public Opinion and the Fallout-Shelter Issue,”
The Public Opinion Quarterly, (29: 2, 1965), 272. In 1960, the percentage o f people that had given though
to constructing a home shelter was only 21%. Hazel Gaudet Erskine, “The Polls: Atomic Weapons and the
Nuclear Energy,” The Public Opinion Quarterly (27:2, 1963), 160.
Gene N. Levine and John Modell, “American Public Opinion and the Fallout-Shelter Issue,”
The Public Opinion Quarterly, (29: 2, 1965), 272.
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These doubts caused much o f the inaction that civil defense planners identified as apathy
throughout the 1950s and 60s. Business periodicals published articles about slow fallout
shelter market. Business Week addressed the market for shelters, saying that despite all
the talk following the Berlin Crisis fallout shelters became the number one topic of
conversation, yet a “plodding business. C o n s u m e r Reports analyzed the survival
trade saying while it was initially conceived some ten years earlier, it peaked with the
Berlin Crisis o f 1961 but that the response by consumers was “scarcely
o v e r w h e l m i n g . T h e article continued that investment in shelter seemed mainly to be a
habit o f the wealthy. T i m e ran its own obituary o f the survival market in 1962,
blaming the death on “the lull in the cold war.”^^*' The marketing o f the home fallout
shelters raised questions about the role o f advertising for something as serious as
survival. Repeated calls in the mass media for oversight o f the shelter trade and
regulation o f advertisers’ claims demonstrate the different sensibility inherent in the
fallout shelter market than earlier civil defense products that were promoted and sold
without question.
For a moment at the end o f 1962, it seemed that civil defense might finally come
to the forefront o f American politics. During the Cuban Missile Crisis, grocery stores

“Shelters: Lots o f Talk, a Plodding Business,” Business Week, October 7, 1961, 32. See also
“Hazards o f Selling Survival Products,” Business Week, February 24, 1962, 62, The article talked to
manufacturers o f equipment for shelters like food rations, dosimeters, and water. It said that distribution of
such materials through traditional stores was met with failure, and these companies were forced to
distribute their goods through mail-order outlets.
“Enter the Survival Merchants,” Consumer Reports, January 1962, 47.
Ibid. Several articles focused on their ostentatious shelters. See for example: “Bachelor’s
$250,000 Bomb Shelter,” Cosmopolitan, January 1954. 86; “Fallout Protection: Here are Case Histories o f
Family Shelters Recently Built in the West,” Sunset, November 1961, 107-114; “The Sheltered Life,” Time,
October 20, 1961 talked about a shelter in Texas that included “an elevator, a pool table, and a keg o f
wine.”
“From Boom to Bust,” Time, May 18, 1962.
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reported a run on canned goods and worried citizens overwhelmed the phone lines o f
local civil defense offices. The fervor died down quickly and in January o f 1963, a report
by the Associated Press identified a rise in apathy toward civil defense by Americans in
all fifty states.^^^ Civil defense officials continued to stock community shelters, but
rejected the self-help theory o f civil defense that had been in place since 1950.
Companies no longer mass marketed survival products or shelters. Planning on the
national level to protect the American public in case of nuclear war practically stopped
due to budget cuts.^^^
Home fallout shelters carried a heavy cost for homeowners, both monetarily in the
actual cost o f construction and maintenance, and morally with the questions it raised
about sharing resources with neighbors and the community in case o f attack. While
advertisements for fallout shelters and the related accessories continued to use images o f
home and family, their tone lacked the optimism o f those for earlier preparedness
products. Survival seemed less guaranteed by the early 1960s and even if one lived, it
was at the expense o f friends and neighbors who lacked their own shelter. The promotion
of fallout shelters marked the last gasp o f the self-help, family-centered civil defense
campaign. By the mid-1960s, an emphasis on public shelters replaced home-based
preparedness.

255

.

‘Civil Defense Apathy Rising, Say Officials,” Chicago Tribune, January 20, 1963, B8.

B. Wayne Blanchard, American Civil Defense 1945-1984: The Evolution o f Programs and
Policies (FEMA: National Emergency Center, vol. 2, no.2), 9-13.
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CHAPTER 8

ANYONE FOR SURVIVAL?
In 1965, the Saturday Evening Post questioned what happened to fallout shelters.
The article, “Anyone for Survival?” compared the fallout shelter trade to a national fad,
such as hula-hoops, and reported the experience o f a shelter dealer in Michigan who
could not even give away his remaining fallout shelters.^^^ The lukewarm response to
civil defense consumer goods suggests American ambivalence toward civil defense;
opinion polls offer evidence o f an even more complicated public reaction.
Polls during World W ar II had indicated a faith in the necessity o f civil defense,
but by the close of the 1950s, Americans began to see futility in such efforts. Thirty
percent o f those polled in 1945 favored a mandatory one-year training period for young
women in “civilian defense or other work that would be useful in wartime.”^^* In 1953,
not even five percent o f respondents said that they were doing “any work in the civilian
defense program” and only two percent planned to construct a shelter in the next year.^^^
Americans did not completely reject civil defense, however. In 1956, sixty-five percent
o f those polled approved o f a “plan to require every man and woman to spend an average
o f one hour a week in Civil Defense work.”^^*' The seeming disconnect between the two

Alfred Balk, “Anyone for Survival?” The Saturday Evening Post, March 27, 1965, 72-74.
Gallup Poll #359, October 31, 1945, in Gallup Brain, online database, cited March 14, 2006.
Gallup Poll #517, July 2, 1953, in Gallup Brain, online database, cited March 14, 2006.
^ Gallup Poll # 568, August 1, 1956, in Gallup Brain, onhne database, cited March 14, 2006.
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polls indicates the public zealousness Americans quickly afforded government programs
in the conservative postwar period, but the personal ambivalence many Americans
harbored for civil defense. These and other Gallup Polls indicate that a wide gap existed
between the narrative o f civil defense in government publications and the popular media
and in actual practice. In reality, Americans expressed a more complicated attitude
toward civil defense than the exuberant attitude claimed by FCDA officials.
Interest in civil defense swelled with the tides o f international politics. The first
wave o f interest in the early 1950s coincided with the testing o f atomic weapons by the
Soviet Union. The next fifteen years continued much in the same way. Cycles o f apathy,
enthusiasm, and a return to apathy guided both public interest in civil defense products
and legislative funding for preparedness. Budget appropriations never increased to levels
needed to prepare Americans adequately for possible attack. From 1951 to 1961, civil
defense officials requested $2.5 billion, but Congress only appropriated $622 million for
the program, only about 25% o f the amount officials needed for the a fully functioning
program.^^'
By the end of the 1950s, Americans’ modest interest in civil defense became
clear. Also, national magazines began to focus on the futility o f preparedness. Women,
once the key to civil defense, rejected such policies. In 1955, women in New York City
acted out against the evacuation drills o f Operation Alert using the “image o f enraged
motherhood.

The women, using their traditional role as mothers protested the

R. Brody and E. Tufte, "Constituent-Congressional Communication on Fall- out Shelters; The
Congressional Polls," Journal o f Communication, (14: 1, 1964), 35.
Dee Garrison, “Our Skirts Gave Them Courage: The Civil Defense Protest Movement in New
York City, 1955-1961,” in Not June Cleaver: Women and Gender in Postwar America, 1945-1960, edited
by Joanne Meyerowitz (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1994), 202.
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government policy and rallied for an end to “atomic testing, the arms race, and civil
defense e f f o r t s . E v e n as President Kennedy called for the construction o f private
home shelters in 1961, most Americans ignored such calls.^^"^ Civil defense formed an
important part o f the political discussion in the 1950s and early 60s, but the historical
record indicates a much more ambivalent relationship by most Americans with the
program than previously thought.
While civil defense effectively functioned to offer reassuring messages about
survival, it also offered important instruction about what it took to be a good American
during the post-World W ar II period. Official materials o f the FCDA and the Ad
Council, as well as advertisements and information produced by private parties all
reinforced messages about America during the Cold War. The emphasis on the nuclear
family and the home as the site of survival privileged suburban families as the norm
during the period. Further, appeals to men and women as mothers and fathers, placed the
nuclear family at the center of the civil defense effort and as the most prized unit in the
militarized American society during the Cold War.
In popular memory, civil defense is recalled as the construction o f fallout shelters
by naïve Americans in their basements and b a c k y a r d s . T h i s kitschy characterization
conceals the real tensions o f civil defense in the 1950s and 1960s. The informational
materials, advertisements, and products developed for civil defense lends insight into the

Dee Garrison, Bracing fo r Armageddon: Why Civil Defense Never Worked (Oxford: New
York: Oxford University Press, 2006), 209.
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See for example the website www.CONELRAD.com. The movie Blast From the Past,
directed by Hugh Scott (1999), focused on a family that lived in their fallout shelter in southern California
for thirty years and their introduction to late 1990s Los Angeles.
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tensions that drove American society in the years following World War II. They offer a
real understanding o f the ways in which Americans were presented with messages about
atomic war and survival, home and family, and religion and civic duty. Civil defense
functioned as more than a just a method o f preparing Americans for atomic war, it helped
create a new sensibility about nuclear weapons and the Cold War, that lasted through the
early 1960s.
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